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ABSTRACT

The devolution of welfare services in the United States has increased the importance of
the nonprofit sector. Geiger and Wolch argue that decentralization has left nonprofit
organizations (NPOs) under the purview of the state. They refer to this as the “shadow
state.” Trudeau argues for a more nuanced view of the shadow state in which
governmental agencies and NPOs are highly interdependent. This research expands on
the findings of Trudeau by extending the shadow state construct to the individual. I
examine the role of refugees in the shadow state construct and their ability to affect
government policy through participation in NPOs and find that refugees do indeed
play a role in the shadow state. Through feedback, experience and, most importantly,
by becoming part of the organization, refugees can have an impact on refugee services
through participation in NPOs.

iv

Table of Contents
Introduction

1

Research Question

2

Historical and Legal Context of the Cuban Refugee Movement in the US

3

Why Miami Cubans?

7

Why Catholic Charities?

11

Chapter 1: Literature Review

15

Understanding the Shadow State

15

The Role of Scale and the Nonprofit Sector in the Shadow State Construct

21

Chapter 2: Methods

25

Chapter 3: Case Study

31

Cuban Heritage Collection

31

Introduction

31

Cuban Refugee Center: Voluntary Agencies

32

Geiger and Wolch (G&W)

34

Trudeau (T)

36

Including Refugees in the Shadow State

41

Catholic Charities – Miami, FL

51

Introduction

51

Feedback

52

Experience

61

Becoming Part of the Organization

67

Chapter 4: Conclusion

73

Bibliography

78

v

List of Appendices

Vita

85

Appendix 1 – USCC “Family Survey”

86

Appendix 2 – USCC “Family Survey” Letter

91
92

vi

List of Figures
Figure 1: La Ermita de la Virgen de la Caridad (The Shrine of Our Lady of Charity)

12

Figure 2: Diagram of Case Study

32

vii

INTRODUCTION
[Civil society organizations] 1 provide a means for governments to
consult migrants and thus ensure a better match between
programmes and migrants’ actual requirements (Spencer 2005, p.
3).
Since the 1960s, the welfare system in the United States (US) has undergone a
devolution of services to local levels. These changes have increased the importance of
the nonprofit sector by increasing its role in the administration of services in the welfare
state (Trudeau 2008). In 1986, Geiger and Wolch (G&W) coined the term “shadow
state” to explain the increasingly important role of nonprofit organizations (NPOs) in
the modern welfare state. The shadow state, as defined by Wolch, is:
[A] para-state apparatus comprised of multiple voluntary sector
organizations, administered outside of traditional democratic
politics and charged with major collective service responsibilities
previously shouldered by the public sector, yet remaining within
the purview of state control (Wolch 1990, p. xvi, in Trudeau 2008).
Trudeau (T) (2008) argues for a more nuanced view of the shadow state that emphasizes
the role of NPOs through the development of interdependent relationships between
official government agencies and the nonprofit sector. Government agencies depend on
NPOs for the provision of information and the distribution of services. Conversely, the
nonprofit sector relies on the government for funding.

Trudeau argues that the

Civil society entities are, “Non-governmental associations of citizens, charitable or otherwise, formed for
the purpose of providing benefit to the members and to society. The term includes non-governmental
organizations engaged in humanitarian work” (USDOS). These entities will be referred to as
“nongovernmental organizations,” “VOLAGs”, “voluntary agencies” and the “third sector” throughout
this thesis. These terms are used interchangeably.
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government exerts control over NPOs, and that these organizations in turn have the
power to influence policy, particularly as pertains to the provision of services.
Despite this important addition to our understanding of the shadow state,
Trudeau’s research stops short of exploring the role of refugees, or even considering if
they have a role, in the shadow state construct. It is the aim of this research to examine
the role of refugees in the shadow state and their ability to affect government programs
through participation in NPOs. I will focus on the following three research questions:
1. How does devolution lead to the democratization of welfare services, thereby
better enabling service providers to meet the needs of their clients?
2. How do refugees, through NPOs, influence services that are provided?
3. How do actors and institutions at the local, state and national scales operate
within the shadow state construct?
The thesis is divided into four major sections. First, I will review literature
pertaining to the devolution of welfare services in the US and Europe. Second, I will
describe the methods used to complete this research. Third, I will present a case study
of Cuban refugees in Miami. The case study will be divided into two stages, namely 1)
secondary data analysis; and 2) participant observation through volunteer work at the
Refugee Resettlement Program of Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Miami.
Lastly, I discuss the broader impacts of this thesis and provide ideas for future research.
Before beginning, it is important to understand the historical and legal context of the
Cuban refugee flow to the US, and why I have chosen Miami-based Cubans and
Catholic Charities for this study.
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Historical and Legal Context of the Cuban Refugee Movement in the US

In 1959, Fidel Castro ascended to power in Cuba after successfully overthrowing
the Batista regime. This event contributed to decades of exodus from the island nation.
The exodus can be broken into roughly four waves. The first wave of Cubans arrived
immediately after the fall of Batista in 1959. Within the first few years, over 200,000
Cubans fled their country and resettled in the US (Nackerud et al. 1999). This initial
group of exiles was primarily upper-middle class, and they believed that Castro would
be quickly removed from power (ibid.). In 1961, a US-backed group of Cuban exiles
invaded Cuba in an attempt to overthrow Castro, known as the Bay of Pigs. This
unsuccessful attempt was followed by several other failed coup attempts. It became
increasingly clear that the Castro regime was not going to be immediately overthrown.
In 1965, the second wave of Cuban exiles began arriving in the US. From 1965-1973,
Cubans seeking asylum in the US could board Freedom Flights from Cuba to the US
(Nackerud et al. 1999). These flights were organized by the US and Cuban governments
as part of the Memorandum of Understanding (ibid.). During eight years of flights,
over 250,000 Cubans entered the US (ibid.). Following a relatively calm period, the
third wave of Cuban refugees arrived in 1980.

This wave, perhaps the most

controversial, occurred when a group of Cubans stormed the Peruvian embassy in
Cuba, demanding asylum. The Peruvian government refused to hand the Cubans over
to the Castro regime. Infuriated, Castro withdrew all protection from the Peruvian
embassy, underestimating the exodus that would occur. Subsequently, thousands more
3

stormed the embassy. Castro, in a fit of anger, allowed 125,000 people to leave Cuba
through the port of Mariel (ibid.). The Mariel Boatlift, as it came to be called, received
great opposition in the US. The vast number of exiles tested the patience of people in
the US. Matters were further exacerbated by stories of Castro using the boatlift to
offload his prisoners and socially undesirable people onto the US (ibid.). As a result,
the Marielitos, as those who arrived in the boatlift came to be known, were not
immediately granted refugee status (ibid.). Eventually, in 1984, they were granted
residency status under the Cuban Adjustment Act (ibid.). The final wave of exiles was
comprised of balseros (rafters). The Balsero Crisis, beginning in 1994, consisted of the
capture of over 28,000 Cuban rafters by US forces, and their subsequent transfer to a US
Naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (ibid.). The balseros were detained at the base for
eight months until the US and Cuba came to a mutual agreement that guaranteed 20,000
regular immigration visas per year for Cubans, but eliminating their automatic refugee
status (ibid.). This was only one of many changes in US policy towards Cuban exiles in
the past five decades.
Prior to the 1960s, refugee policy in the US focused primarily on defining who
was or was not a refugee, but gave no consideration to resettlement (Zucker 1983). The
first semblance of our modern refugee system appeared in the Corporate Affidavit
Program of 1946 (ibid.).

This program established a relationship between the

government and VOLAGs that allowed VOLAGs to submit an affidavit of support
(guaranteeing that the recipient would not become a public charge) on behalf of
thousands of displaced persons who otherwise would not have qualified for
4

resettlement in the US (ibid.). This first step was important for two reasons. First, it
created a legal relationship between the government and VOLAGs.

Second, the

program was so successful that it led to the establishment of the Displaced Persons Act
of 1948.

This act, the first significant refugee legislation in the US, assigned the

responsibility of resettling refugees to VOLAGs (ibid.). The VOLAGs’ first opportunity
to exercise their new role occurred after the 1956 Hungarian uprising. Federal funding
supported the VOLAGs efforts to resettle Hungarian refugees, setting an important
precedent for the Cuban refugee flow that was to follow.
As the first Cuban exiles began to arrive, VOLAGs relied on their own resources
to aid in their resettlement (ibid.). However, by 1960 the number of refugees exceeded
the financial capacity of VOLAGs (ibid.).

In December 1960, the Cuban Refugee

Emergency Center was established by President Eisenhower and VOLAGs received
federal funding to resettle Cuban exiles.

Two years later, Congress passed the

Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, establishing the Cuban Refugee Program
(the Program). The Program was responsible for organizing refugee benefits, such as
health care, housing, education, professional licensure, etc. (ibid.). A few years later,
Congress passed the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, which provided Cuban exiles a
path to Legal Permanent Residency.
By 1980, Congress sought to replace the Cuban-specific refugee program with a
universal refugee program, the Refugee Act of 1980 (ibid.). As part of this act, the US
adopted the definition of “refugee” found in the 1951 United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, “ [any person] who can establish persecution or a
5

well-founded fear of persecution in their home country on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion” (USDOS
2001). In addition, the Refugee Act of 1980 recognized the Office of the US Coordinator
for Refugee Affairs. The coordinator was “instructed to ‘consult regularly with States,
localities, and private nonprofit voluntary agencies concerning the sponsorship process
and the intended distribution of refugees’” (Zucker 1983, p. 178). Finally, the 1980 law
established the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), which is responsible for the
provision of refugee assistance (ibid.). However, within weeks of its passage, the Act
was met with strong opposition from Cubans (ibid.).2

In response, a new status,

“Cuban-Haitian Entrant” was created. This status allowed Cubans and Haitians who
entered the US between the 21st of April and the 10th of October of 1980 to become legal
permanent residents after one year in the US (ibid.). A further response to the Act of
1980 was the passage of the Fascell-Stone Amendment in 1982 that granted entrants
equal benefits as refugees (ibid.).

Today, according to the volunteer orientation

provided by Catholic Charities, Cuban and Haitians may enter the United States under
“parole” status. Parole is a conditional status granted to Cubans and Haitians upon
arrival in the US. This status can be adjusted to legal permanent resident after one year,
however until that time they are considered “entrants.” As a Cuban or Haitian entrant,
the individual is eligible for the same benefits as a refugee. Their interaction with the

Cubans opposed the legislation because it sought to strip many Cubans of refugee benefits. However,
this law was amended by the creation of the “Cuban-Haitian Entrant” status and the Fascell-Stone
Amendment that guaranteed entrants the same assistance as refugees.

2
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Refugee Resettlement Program of Catholic Charities is the same, their orientation and
services are the same, and therefore all will be referred to as “refugees” in this paper.

Why Miami Cubans?

This research focuses on the Cuban population of Miami.

The Cuban exile

community in Florida has been the focus of national attention for the past half century.
Their public exodus from Cuba started in the 1950s and continues today, and it has
been well documented and heavily publicized. I chose to study Cubans in Miami
primarily because of the availability of data on this community. For example, The
Cuban Heritage Collection, housed at the University of Miami and home to a large
collection of records relating to the Cuban diaspora, was especially important for this
thesis.
The location of this collection in Miami is fitting, as Florida is home to 68% of the
Cuban population in the US (Pew 2006). Familial ties, cultural and climatic similarities,
and the geographic proximity to Cuba all contribute to the dense settlement of Cubans
in South Florida. However, modern Miami’s importance as a Latino center extends
beyond the Cuban community. Jaime Roldos, past president of Ecuador, illustrated the
importance of Miami to the Americas when he named Miami “the capital of Latin
America.” Miami earned this title because of the large Latino population and the strong
touristic and business ties between the city and Latin America (Levine 1985). According
to 2008 statistics released by the Pew Hispanic Center (based on US Census statistics),
62% of the Miami-Dade county population identifies itself as Hispanic (Pew 2010).
7

Despite its domestic significance as one of the fastest growing Sunbelt cities, Miami has
increasingly depended on Latin America for its economic growth (Levine 1985). It
comes as no surprise, given its geographic location, that Miami has come to serve as the
gateway between the Americas. Latin investors have turned to Miami not only as a
tourist destination, but for its friendly business environment. Miami offers a stable
economic and social environment where financial establishments have flourished and
business can be conducted in a stable and secure environment (in stark contrast to the
volatility of many Latin American markets) (Levine 1985). No single group has been
more responsible for Miami’s ascent than the Cubans (Levine 1985; McHugh et al. 1997;
Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Portes and Stepick 1993).
One Cuban banker put it this way,
Miami was a typical southern city, with an important population of
retirees and veterans […]. No one thought of transforming Miami
into what it is today. It is no exaggeration to say that the motor of
this Great Change were the Cuban men and women […]. These
last decades have witnessed the foundation of a dynamic and
multi-faceted Miami over the past of a Miami that was merely
provincial and tourist-oriented. Today, the level of progress has
reached unanticipated heights (Portes and Rumbaut 2006, p. 156).
Cubans have made Miami their own through tremendous political involvement.
According to McHugh et al. (1997, p. 515) “Cubans are one of the most geographically
concentrated immigrant ethnic groups in the United States.

[…] Rather than

assimilating in the classic sense, Miami Cubans have remade the city in their own
image.” Portes and Rumbaut (2006) recount an example how Cubans in Miami used
their concentrated numbers and political will to vote out politicians who favored
8

unpopular policies, such as an anti-bilingual referendum, and replaced them with exile
Cuban candidates. The political clout of Miami Cubans extends beyond the local and
into state and federal levels as well (i.e. Hiram Ruiz, Director of Refugee Services for
Florida Department of Children and Families, Senator Mel Martinez and the newly
elected Senator Marco Rubio) (McHugh et al. 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2006).
Civil society is helpful in understanding the success of Cubans in Miami. Civil
society is a network of community associations that represent the needs of a group
(Espinoza 1999; Foley et al. 1996). The roots of civil society can be traced to eighteenthcentury “Scottish moralists,” such as Adam Smith (Foley et al. 1996, p. 39).
Enlightenment thinkers considered the associations of civil society as necessary for
civility and democratic vitality (ibid.). Civil society organizations are often the
“byproduct of religion, tradition, [and] shared historical experience” (Fukuyama 2001,
p. 7). All cultures are based on shared norms, and these norms serve to encourage
cooperation within a community (ibid.). This has certainly been the case with Cubans
in Miami. Historically, Cuban exiles have relied heavily on the Cuban community in
Miami for support. In return, new members of the community have been expected to
vote for Cuban-supported politicians – as illustrated by the anti-bilingual referendum
discussed earlier in this chapter. A defining characteristic of civil society is unified
action to solve problems, which relies on cooperation (Lehning 1997). The Cuban
community in Miami uses its unified voice to pressure authorities and to engender
bottom-up change. In this way, civil society can be seen as “a form of societal selforganization which allows for cooperation with the state” (Hall 1998, p. 32). Citizen
9

participation in voluntary associations and community organizations helps to sustain
civil society by building trust within the community, potentially leading to greater
political participation (Newton 2001). Furthermore, participation in community
associations reinforces relationships and strengthens the social networks of members,
thereby strengthening communities (Lehning 1997).
The Cuban community in Miami has used its social capital to build a strong civil
society. The result has been a powerful ethnic community that has changed the face of
Miami-Dade County through strong local and national political participation.
However, it is important to note the uniqueness of Cuban exiles. Cubans, as a group,
have been exceptional in their high political participation. This is due, in part, to the
high levels of educational and professional attainment of many members of the Cuban
exile community in Miami. The political strength of the Cuban community is also aided
by its location in the most populous county of one of the most important swing states.
Nevertheless, the Cuban community is a unique example how civil society
organizations can instigate change from the bottom-up, while simultaneously using the
shadow state to encourage change at the highest levels of government.
Civil society can help explain the success of the Cuban community from a
bottom-up perspective. However, I am interested in the ways in which governmentsanctioned voluntary agencies can use the federal refugee resettlement program to
scale-up the needs of refugees to state and federal governmental organizations. It is
due to the Cubans’ propensity for political participation that I have decided to study
how Cuban refugees may use voluntary agencies as a platform for political
10

participation. Specifically, I am interested in how refugees can voice their needs and
concerns through local NPOs and how nonprofit organizations, such as the Refugee
Resettlement Program of Catholic Charities, “scale up” their influence.

Why Catholic Charities?

Of the organizations available to Cuban refugees, Catholic Charities has proven
to be one of the most influential because of its early and profound involvement with the
Cuban Diaspora (Walsh 1971). The vast majority of Cubans are, at least nominally,
Catholic. This has placed the Catholic Church in a unique position to aid arriving
refugees, catering to both corporeal and spiritual needs. Tweed (1997) highlights the
concern of the Catholic Church with respect to the Cuban situation and the importance
of the creation of the Archdiocese of Miami. Shortly after the arrival of the first Cuban
exiles in 1959, Archbishop Carroll encouraged the establishment of la Ermita de la Virgen
de la Caridad (The Shrine of Our Lady of Charity) in Miami to, as Tweed recounts, “tend
to the unchurched3 in the exile community” (Tweed 1997, p. 38).

This shrine has

become an important symbol of the Cuban diaspora in Miami, creating both a spiritual
connection to the remembered Cuba of the past and a “physical” connection through
radio broadcasted sermons from the shrine that reach the island nation (Tweed 1997).

The term “unchurched” refers to those who are not actively practicing their faith (Catholicism in this
case), and in particular to those who practice some form of synchronistic religion (the combination of two
or more religions to form a single hybrid religion), such as Santeria.

3
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Figure 1. La Ermita de la Virgen de la Caridad (The Shrine of Our Lady of Charity)
(Source: http://www.ermitadelacaridad.org/ermita.html)

Another account that further emphasizes the role of the Catholic Church in
responding to the Cuban exodus comes from Monsignor Bryan O. Walsh, the Episcopal
Vicar for Spanish-Speaking Peoples of the Catholic Archdiocese of Miami. In 1960,
Walsh created a program for the resettlement of unaccompanied Cuban youth from
communist Cuba to the US that came to be known as Operation Pedro Pan. While in the
initial stage of logistical planning, Walsh’s organization, the Catholic Welfare Bureau,
worked in tandem with other organizations of Protestant and Jewish faiths to organize
the resettlement of unaccompanied Cuban minors to the US. Walsh recognized that his
Catholic Welfare Bureau bore a unique responsibility to the Cuban children, a
sentiment made clear by the following statement, “Since most Cubans were at least

12

nominally Catholic, it was recognized that the main burden would fall on the Catholic
Welfare Bureau” (Walsh 1971, p. 388).
In my consideration of nonprofit organizations it became clear that Catholic
Charities offered the best opportunity to employ, as Kodras (1997, p. 80) has suggested,
a “flexible use of scale and scope.”4 The aforementioned responsiveness and sense of
obligation of the Catholic Church to the Cuban diaspora made Catholic Charities a
natural choice for this project. In addition, as will be seen, Catholic Charities has an
impressive network of governmental and nongovernmental partnerships that offer a
good example of how an organization can transcend scale.

For instance, Catholic

Charities has “scaled up” its power to the national scale. It becomes clear in Walsh’s
account that the Catholic Church actively organized local efforts on the ground, in both
Cuba and the United States, while simultaneously cooperating with other religious and
governmental organizations (within and outside of the Catholic Charities umbrella) to
petition the federal government for financial aid. Their on-the-ground-expertise and
experience was well received by government and business officials alike, who were
needed for the financial backing of the operation. Ultimately, they secured funding for
the program through an impressive network of nonprofit, commercial, and government
agencies. Throughout the organization of Operation Pedro Pan, Walsh was in continuous
contact with actors at various scales. At the local level, Cuban and Cuban-American

A flexible use of scale and scope refers to “institutions and groups operating in one place draw[ing] on the
resources and abilities of institutions and groups elsewhere to enhance their own capacity to meet societal
responsibilities” (Kodras 1997, p. 80).
4
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Catholics approached Walsh and the Catholic Church for help. In response, Walsh used
his local contacts to coordinate with leaders of other local nonprofit organizations who,
together, applied for financial aid from the federal government to relocate Cuban
youths to the US. In a 1971 journal article published in the Journal of Interamerican
Studies and World Affairs, Walsh writes about the experience of working with
employees of the U.S. Department of State (USDOS), US presidential advisors, foreign
governmental officials, child welfare agencies, and officials from Catholic, Protestant
and Jewish faith based organizations to provide information regarding the resettlement
of Cubans in Miami (Walsh 1971).
Catholic Charities’ impressive network of aid organizations that span the local,
state, national and international scale provide a unique opportunity to understand how
a voluntary organization can scale-up the needs of its clientele. Additionally, the Cuban
diaspora has been well documented. Information, such as that available in the Cuban
Heritage Collection, provides strong contextual footing for this thesis.

Using this

information and a case study of Cuban refugees in the Refugee Resettlement Program
of Catholic Charities of Miami, I will investigate the ways in which nonprofit
organizations include refugees in the political process.

Using qualitative research

methods, I aim to provide empirical evidence to support Spencer’s (2005, p. 3) claim
that local NPOs “provide a means for governments to consult migrants and thus ensure
a better match between programmes and migrants’ actual requirements.”

14

CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW
Understanding the Shadow State

Beginning in the 1960s, the US and many other developed nations partly
privatized welfare service delivery (Kramer 2000; Wolch 1990). The restructuring of the
welfare sector intensified during the 1970s and 1980s due to economic pressures from a
global recession (Wolch 1990). Governments increasingly used and funded nonprofit
organizations (NPOs) for service provision, which resulted in a worldwide increase in
the number of NPOs (Kramer 2000). The number of NPOs in the United States alone
increased from 50,000 in the 1940s to 1,400,000 in 2000 (ibid.). Increased governmental
funding of NPOs for the provision of welfare services has been the main impetus
behind their increase in the US (Nightingale et al. 1997). Through grants and subsidies,
the US government has “become a more important source of revenue in the nonprofit
sector than all private giving combined” (Kramer 1989, in Wolch 1990, p. x). The
increasing importance of government funding to NPOs is particularly important to
refugee resettlement because almost all countries, including the US, that offer refugee
resettlement services depend on some kind of public-private partnership (Wright 1981).
The increased importance of the voluntary sector could, as suggested by Geiger and
Wolch (1986), lead to the emergence of a shadow state. In a shadow state, voluntary
agencies are largely responsible for shouldering the burden of the welfare sector, while
remaining under the auspices of the state (Geiger and Wolch 1986). Wolch and Rocha
(1993) argue that governmental responsibilities for welfare services are increasingly
15

moved to the voluntary sector. Geiger and Wolch (1986) are concerned that NPOs that
operate as part of a shadow state are “I) less accountable to the public, II) outside key
democratic controls, and III) remain circumscribed by government” (p. 364). However,
despite these concerns, the offloading of governmental welfare responsibilities has
enjoyed great public support for a variety of reasons. Kramer, in the introduction to
Wolch (1990) explains that leaders on the both the Right and the Left have extolled the
virtues of voluntarism. Those on the Right view voluntary organizations as a manner to
keep government small through privatization, while those on the Left consider the
sector as a means to strengthen communities. Despite the shadow state’s reputation as
a tool of the political right, Wolch (1990) points out that the shadow state has been
pursued by both liberal and conservative administrations in many countries. In the US,
privatization of services during the 1960s and 1970s began under democratic leadership,
and continued under republican rule (ibid.).

Privatization accelerated under the

Reagan administration, and was a major part of the welfare reform that President
Clinton introduced in 1996 (Bartkowski 2003).

The bipartisan push towards

decentralization in the US was backed by a Republican-controlled Congress and its
Contract with America. This program sought to reduce the size and scope of the federal
government through the devolution of responsibilities to local and state governments.
In 2001, President George W. Bush created the Office of Faith-Based and Community
Initiatives (OFBCI) to increase the funding of local and faith-based organizations.
Under this initiative, federal funding would support the delivery of social services by
these organizations.
16

The increasingly central role of the shadow state is a “contradictory
phenomenon” (Wolch 1990, p. xvi).

The shadow state serves to democratize the

provision of welfare services, while increasing the role of the government in the daily
activities of voluntary organizations (Wolch 1990). The implications of the shadow state
are not, as of yet, fully understood. Supporters of privatization point to increased
efficiency (Geiger and Wolch 1986).5

They argue that privatization supports the

advantages of competition, such as greater responsiveness and innovation (Nightingale
et al. 1997). Moreover, they argue that nongovernmental organizations can provide
services that are two to four times cheaper than state services (Wright 1981). Wright
(1981) continues that VOLAGs offer “significant advantages as the vehicle for [refugee]
resettlement” because of their flexibility and responsiveness during crisis situations (p.
171). In addition to flexibility and responsiveness, NPOs offer services with a “more
human face” (Neldner 1997, p. 2). Again, this is of particular importance to the refugee
resettlement organizations that have longer-term responsibility for their clients.
VOLAGs are required, by their government grant agreements, to follow-up with
refugee-clients during the first year of resettlement (Wright 1981, pp. 172). Follow-up
contact with refugees is highly advantageous because of the danger of losing track of
refugees when they enter the welfare system (ibid.). Furthermore, VOLAGs have a
great ability to elicit public support for refugee movements (ibid.). Wright notes that
VOLAG constituents often show great interest in getting involved with refugee

5

Opposition to privatization will be discussed later in this Chapter.
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resettlement, and that the constituents’ interest increases public support for refugee
admissions (ibid.). Support for refugee movements can come in a variety of forms,
including donations, housing, cash and community acceptance of refugee populations
(ibid.). Young (2000) argues that the voluntary sector can provide customized service to
heterogeneous communities. Governments contract out to local service providers due
to their (government’s) inability to adequately differentiate welfare services to meet the
needs of a heterogeneous citizenry (Young 2000).

Another key advantage of

nongovernmental organizations is that they can work in areas where the UN and
governmental agencies cannot, for political reasons, be involved.

One example of

NGOs providing humanitarian support when governmental agencies were politically
unwilling is shared by Neldner (1997). In the late 1980s, NGOs provided food to
conflict-ravaged areas of Ethiopia because official aid channels were unwilling to work
with the Mengistu regime (ibid.). Furthermore, NGOs can be used as a vehicle for
service delivery when governmental agencies lack legitimacy.

After the 1992 Los

Angeles riots, city officials, including the mayor and city council, formed a
nongovernmental organization, Rebuild LA (RLA), to aid in the revitalization of poor
neighborhoods in Los Angeles.6 City officials felt that RLA would be more legitimate,
and therefore more effective in rebuilding post-riot Los Angeles than the government
(Ferris 1998). The RLA could legitimately serve community members who, because of
the outcome of the Rodney King trial, felt disenfranchised by local government. The
Citywide riots resulted from the not-guilty verdicts for Los Angeles police officers who were accused of
beating Rodney King, an African American.
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city of Los Angeles used the RLA to reestablish legitimacy by providing community
revitalization services to the neighborhoods most affected by the 1992 riots.
Not everybody is supportive of the dismantling and offloading of the centralized
state welfare system to lower levels of governance. Wolch (1990) argues that heavy
reliance on governmental funding will make the voluntary sector increasingly subject to
state regulation:
The increasing importance of state funding for many voluntary
organizations has been accompanied by deepening penetration by
the state into voluntary group organization, management, and
goals. […] the transformation of the voluntary sector into a shadow
state apparatus could ultimately shackle its potential to create
progressive social change (ibid., p. 15).
As voluntary agencies become increasingly dependent on government grants, Wolch
(1990) fears that they may become a “puppet or pawn in the service of goals that are
antithetical to their organizational mission” (p. 217). In the introduction to Wolch
(1990), Kramer states that:
The degree to which their advocacy seeks to promote controversial
change—or challenge the prevailing distribution of power and
other resources—seems to be a critical determinant of their fate and
their ability to continue receiving governmental funding (p. xi).
Wolch (1999) argues that power relations between government and nonprofit
organizations are not equal, and that NPOs are “often junior partners” to more
powerful governmental organizations (p. 26). The increasing dependence of nonprofit
organizations on government contracts decreases the ability of nonprofit organizations
to be critical of government policy (Wolch 1990). Voluntary groups are likely to shy
away from “excessive activism” that may result in loss of government funding (Geiger
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and Wolch 1986, p. 359). Furthermore, dependence on state funding forces voluntary
groups to plan “reactively” to government priorities, as opposed to exercising
innovation and challenging the status quo (Wolch and Rocha 1993, p. 389). Those
organizations that are best able to adapt to governmental funding are often larger
organizations.

Geiger and Wolch (1986) fear that “heightened competition among

voluntary groups may work to the detriment of smaller less financially secure
organizations” (p. 358).
Geographic disparities in services are another concern. Kodras (1997) states,
The current reductions in the scale and scope of the American state
will increase geographic disparities in the role and effect of
government in accordance with the capacity of institutions and
groups in particular places to take on functions previously
coordinated by the national government. The capacity to assume
these responsibilities is defined by the extent to which fiscal
resources, expertise, infrastructure, and political will exist, or can
be developed, within specific locales. In this sense, capacity for
governance is geographically and historically produced (Kodras
1997, p. 80).
Kodras argues that devolution will lead to a geographically uneven distribution of
welfare services. Moreover, those geographic regions most in need of services, such as
inner cities, will have least access to welfare services.
Another potential consequence of devolution is the reduction of political
autonomy at the local level. Peck argues that government should be close to the people,
but that action must take place at higher scales where rules are made:
Local action can be only part of the solution and, uncoordinated, it
may remain part of the problem…political action must confront the
level at which the rules of regime competition are set (the
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supranational/global) not that at which the rules are carried out
(the local) (Peck 1995, p. 257).
Peck sees the devolution of responsibility to the local scale as “the prerequisite to the
competitive downgrading of regulatory norms” (Peck 1995, p.255). It is, according to
Peck, the institutions at national and international scales that set the rules. The local
scale is then left to carry out these rules, but does not necessarily have the ability to
influence them. If Peck is correct, then local organizations need to transcend these
scales to exert influence on the rules that locally bind them. They must “scale up” their
influence to the scales at which decisions are made. Kodras (1997) argues for,
the flexible use of scale and scope, whereby institutions and groups
operating in one place draw on the resources and abilities of
institutions and groups elsewhere to enhance their own capacity to
meet societal responsibilities (p. 80).
According to Kodras, scale becomes a key factor for understanding the role of the
nonprofit sector in the shadow state.

The Role of Scale and the Nonprofit Sector in the Shadow State Construct

“Within the USA, the impetus of the federal welfare state since the 1970s has
been to devolve responsibilities to lower levels” (DeVerteuil et al. 2002, p. 230). The
devolution of services has increased the importance of the voluntary sector, further
incorporating it into the local welfare system and local politics (ibid.). DeVerteuil et al.
(2002) go on to state that the hallmarks of the voluntary sector are “accessibility, uneven
constraints, and local uniqueness” (p. 231). Many at the local level see the devolution of
services as an opportunity to locate them “closer to the ground” (Taylor and Bassi 1998,
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p. 120). The initiative of local authorities to locate services “closer to the ground”
illustrates two important points. First, forces for devolution can come from below as
well as from above. Here we see local authorities taking the initiative to set up local
organizations meant to influence local policy. Secondly, a power conflict between the
federal government and the local third sector becomes apparent, as illustrated in the
following quote:
At the same time that central government sought to employ the
third sector as an agent for service delivery, it saw the sector
deployed to some effect by politically antagonistic [local]
authorities (Taylor and Bassi 1998, p. 120).
The significance and role of the third sector varies at different scales. While the central
government saw the third sector as a potential apolitical agent that could cheaply
provide services as part of a shadow state, local authorities regarded the third sector as
a tool for organizing grass-roots participation in local politics. Another instance of the
dual vision of the third sector comes from the Greater London Council (GLC), as
documented by Geiger and Wolch (1986).

GLC provided funding for innovative

voluntary agencies in order to garner grass roots support against unpopular policies of
the Thatcher administration. Recognizing this, the central government attacked the
GLC, eventually leading to its closure. The case of GLC highlights the ideological clash
that can exist between organizations at different scales. GLC, at the local scale, aimed to
mobilize grass roots support for anti-Thatcher policies. The central government, at the
national scale, used its power to shut down the GLC.
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A primary objective for many organizations in the nonprofit sector is the scalingup of issues to raise awareness (Henderson 2002). Henderson (2002) explains: “‘scalingup’ occurs when organizations extend their scope and power through […] linkages with
other organizations” (p. 109). One example from Neldner (1997) is the ability of NGOs
to scale-up the concerns of those affected by forced migration to the national and
international arena. Neldner (1997) points out that building awareness of refugee needs
has been a primary role of NGOs, and that these NGOs have successfully brought
refugee issues to the attention of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
In another example of scaling-up, Cullen (2009) explains how pro-migrant NGOs
in Ireland have sought to influence government policy through associations with
governmental officials.

Through these associations, NGOs aided migrants by

influencing officials to reconsider individual migrant cases (Cullen 2009). Furthermore,
these NGOs (the Migrants Rights Center of Ireland and the Immigrant Council of
Ireland) have used international organizations, such as the European Commission (EC)
and the United Nations (UN), as venues to fight for the rights of migrants in Ireland
(ibid.). For example, Cullen states that
The UN has proved a more useful context for employing ‘shaming’
tactics regarding the Irish state’s record of non-compliance with
international accords. […] pro-migrant NGOs have supported
cases including a July 2008 European Court of Justice ruling which
overturned Irish restrictions on the residency rights of non-EU
citizen spouses (Cullen 2009, p. 105).
Irish pro-migrant NGOs have also used local media to exert power at the national scale.
The NGOs used stories of individual migrants in local media to counter the
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predominant image of immigrants as “suspect, untrustworthy free loaders who
displace Irish workers” (Cullen 2009, p. 106). In one instance, a local NGO produced a
documentary that was aired on national television that highlighted the injustice and
hypocrisy of the Irish government. It argued that the government pushed for the
legalization of undocumented Irish immigrants abroad while denying the same benefits
to undocumented immigrants in Ireland (Cullen 2009). This documentary provides
another example how local NGOs can advance their interests at national and
international scales. By highlighting the commonalities of migration issues throughout
the world, local NGOs can ostensibly reach the national and international scales where
regime rules are established.7
Understanding how organizations in the nonprofit sector work at different scales
is helpful for understanding their position in the shadow state:
If we are to understand the impact that changes [of
decentralization] in the state have on the third sector, we must
understand the dynamics of the relationship between national and
local government as well as those between the state as a whole and
the third sector (Taylor and Bassi 1998, pp. 134-135).
How these organizations work at different scales, and how they bridge the gap between
these scales, is necessary to understanding how NPOs can facilitate refugee inclusion in
the shadow state. I will discuss how these scalar politics operate for Cuban refugees in
Miami in Chapter 3.

An international regime is defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decisionmaking procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given issue area” (Krasner 1983, p. 2)

7
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CHAPTER 2: METHODS
I used qualitative research methods to engage with my research questions.
Qualitative methods are best suited for my study because they allow me to analyze the
meanings behind people’s actions. Discrepancies between words and actions can be
deciphered through qualitative research (Herbert 2000). “Ethnography […] examines
what people do as well as what they say. It thus enables an insightful examination of
any discrepancies between thoughts and deeds” (Herbert 2000, p. 552, emphasis in
original). Qualitative methods allow a researcher to understand an observation not
simply as a solitary point in time, but as an event within a greater context. Clifford
Geertz referred to this method as “thick description.”

The contextualization of

observations within a larger framework provides deeper understandings of meaning.
Herbert states that
[T]he tissue of social life is not always observable. The meanings of
objects and events are often revealed through practices, reactions,
cursory comments and facial expressions. […] These meanings are
discerned through inferences, as daily practice is interpreted
against the ethnographer’s developing understanding of the larger
cultural system of which it is apart (Herbert 2000, p. 553).
The use of qualitative research methods will allow me to better understand how
refugees have been brought into the shadow state and the operation of scale in the
shadow state. A discussion of my methods follows.
Initially my research was divided into four stages, namely: 1) secondary data
analysis; 2) participant observation through volunteer work at the Refugee Resettlement
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Program, Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Miami; 3) administration of a
questionnaire to refugees; and 4) in-depth, semi-structured and unstructured
interviews. However, as is often the case in the field, my methods changed during my
fieldwork research with the Refugee Resettlement Program. Due to privacy concerns,
the organization did not allow the use of interviews or questionnaires.

Instead, I

attended weekly job seminars, and I conducted extensive archival research at the Cuban
Heritage Collection.
The first research stage consisted of the compilation of contextual data on the
shadow state and the Cuban refugee community in Miami. I read academic journals
and books, and conducted extensive research at the University of Miami’s Cuban
Heritage Collection. This collection documents more than 400 years of Cuban history in
books, periodicals, archived materials and an extensive digital collection. The archived
materials and digital collection consist of photographs, manuscripts, maps, and other
materials from individuals and organizations – from Cuba and the Cuban diaspora.
The collection of Cuban materials increased dramatically in the 1960s, with the arrival
of thousands of Cubans to the Miami area (Cuban Heritage Collection). Since that time
it has grown to be recognized as the “premier collection of materials documenting the
Cuban exile and Cuban-American experience as well as the largest repository of
historical and cultural Cuban materials outside of Cuba” (Cuban Heritage Collection, p.
1). Of greatest significance to this research, the collection became home to thousands of

26

documents from the Cuban Refugee Center (the Center) when it closed in 1994.8 These
107 boxes of documents are found in the “Cuban Refugee Center Records.” This section
contained seven sub-series, namely 1) Cuban Refugee Center Documents and Programs,
2) Government Agencies, 3) Non Governmental Agencies and Organizations, 4)
Publications, 5) Other Documents, 6) Photographs, and 7) Clippings. I focused
primarily on sub-series 1-3 because I was particularly interested in documents that
illustrated the role of the nonprofit sector and scalar relationships between
organizations, such as local nonprofit agencies that explain their local situation to
federal agencies.
The second stage consisted of participant observation with the Refugee
Resettlement Program of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) in
Miami, Florida. USCCB is one of nine voluntary resettlement agencies (VOLAGS) that
are contracted by the United States Department of State (USDOS) to administer federal
services to refugees. I obtained permission from the Volunteer Coordinator of the
Refugee Resettlement Program, Raul Hernandez, to volunteer with the Refugee
Resettlement Program from May 15th, 2010 to June 25th, 2010. After his refusal to
conduct interviews due to privacy concerns, participant observation became an
important part of the data collection.

In participant observation, “the observer

participates in the daily life of the people under study […] observing things that
happen, listening to what is said, and questioning people” (Becker and Geer 1957, p.
The Cuban Refugee Center, also known as the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center, will be discussed in greater
detail in Chapter 3. It is also commonly referred to as the Center, a name that I will use in this thesis.
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28). After each session of participant observation I conducted informal discussions with
employees of Catholic Charity. These discussions allowed me to further investigate the
meaning of observations in a timely manner, thereby gaining deeper insights into the
operation of the organization. As a volunteer I observed two types of events. First, I
observed the intake of two new refugees, which consists of an orientation that explains
the program, welfare benefits and expectations for new arrivals. Secondly, I observed
and participated in three weekly employment meetings that were organized by job
counselors.9 They informed newly arrived refugees about the employment system in
the US.

This participant observation allowed me to gain deeper insights into the

operation of the Refugee Resettlement Program and its role in enabling refugee
participation.

Moreover, these weekly meetings led to an unanticipated insight

regarding how to answer my research questions. Such insights are an important merit
of participant observation.

Bouchard (1976), explaining the benefits of participant

observation, highlights what Merton refers to as the serendipity pattern.

“The

serendipity pattern refers to the fairly common experience of observing an
unanticipated, anomalous strategic datum which becomes the occasion for developing a
new theory or extending an existing theory” (Merton 1949, p. 98, in Bouchard 1976).
Through participant observation I began to see that refugees helped shape the program,
and ultimately the system of services that they administered, by becoming part of the
organization. A large percentage of governmental and non-governmental resettlement
My participation was generally as the token American, confirming what the job counselor taught. For
example, the job counselor would use me as an example of how Americans dress for a job interview.
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programs were staffed by refugees, many from Cuba. This observation formed an
unexpected yet exciting new direction for my research. Refugees are not simply being
brought into the resettlement system through infrequent token involvement, but rather
through employment in the organizations that manage refugee resettlement.

This

phenomenon will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.
My preliminary research design was comprised of four research stages, but this
design was hindered by privacy concerns. I have included the third and fourth step in
this proposal to illustrate my original intentions.
In the third stage, I planned to administer a questionnaire to twenty-five refugees
who currently receive aid from the Refugee Resettlement Program. The purpose of the
questionnaire was to collect information about the refugees’ ability to voice their needs
within the organization, and the extent to which they felt that the organization
responded to those needs. The questionnaire would address the following topics: i)
channels of communication within the organization; ii) responsiveness of the
organization; iii) perception of the organization as a platform that can be used to voice
opinions and needs; iv) instances when participant has voiced an opinion. The data
from the questionnaire would inform questions for subsequent interviews.
The fourth and final phase of my fieldwork research would consist of twenty indepth, unstructured and semi-structured interviews. The first ten interviews would be
semi-structured and would be conducted with refugees who were selected from the
third stage.

Interview questions would be similar to those addressed in the

questionnaire and would provide more detailed answers.

The next ten interviews
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would be selected from representatives of the Refugee Resettlement Program and
would be selected based on their ability to address questions related to the involvement
of refugees in organizational decision making. These interviews of representatives
would be unstructured. Mr. Hernandez, the volunteer coordinator, had enthusiastically
agreed to teach me about the organization, its missions, programs, and funding sources
before I arrived in Miami. Unstructured interviews would allow for a flexible and
responsive interview format that would fit into interviewee schedules and that would
build upon the information from previous interviews, particularly with Mr. Hernandez.
In this way, each successive interview would inform subsequent interviews.
Beardsworth and Keil note that, “the open-ended, discursive nature of the interview
[permits] an iterative process of refinement, whereby lines of thought identified by
earlier interviewees could be taken up and presented to later interviewees”
(Beardsworth and Keil, 1992, pp. 261-262).
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CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDY
Cuban Heritage Collection (CHC)

Introduction

In the literature chapter I explored explanations and examples of the evolution of
the shadow state. These examples came from varying countries, organizations, and
welfare sectors; but all shared a common thread of welfare state devolution. In this
section, I will explore documents that pertain specifically to the devolution of services
for the Cuban diaspora. This section will ground the Cuban refugee experience into
existing literature about the devolution of welfare services while laying the foundation
for my conceptual extension of the shadow state construct. Following is a discussion of
documents from the Cuban Refugee Center that illustrate the existence of a shadow state
among the voluntary agencies (VOLAGs) involved in the Cuban diaspora.
Figure 2 illustrates the case study presented in this chapter. Documents from the
Cuban Heritage Collection illustrate the need for an extended understanding of the
shadow state, as argued in this thesis, while participant observation at the Refugee
Resettlement Program of Catholic Charities illustrates the three methods by which
refugees have come to be included in the shadow state.
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Figure 2. Diagram of Case Study: Overlap of Cuban Heritage Collection (CHC) and Catholic
Charities (CC) research.

Cuban Refugee Center: Voluntary Agencies

In an address to “The United States Conference of Mayors,” Abraham Ribicoff,
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, recognized that voluntary agencies and the
State of Florida had assumed a heavy financial burden to assist refugees (Ribicoff 1962).
As the number of refugees in Miami increased, President John F. Kennedy recognized
that volunteer agencies and the State of Florida would be unable to cope with the
refugee situation without federal assistance and the Cuban Refugee Center was opened in
February of 1961 (Ezquerra 2007). The Center would function under the umbrella of the
Social Security Administration of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
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and the services provided were legislatively defined in the “Migration and Refugee
Assistance Act of 1962” (Ball 1962).

These services included, “reception and

registration, classification of skills, cash assistance and welfare services to those in need,
resettlement and employment opportunities, and provision for education and health
services” (Ball 1962, p. 2). By 1962, between 1,500 and 2,000 Cubans were arriving in
Miami every week (Ezquerra 2007).

The Center’s role, besides managing federal

assistance, was to coordinate the complex web of governmental and independent
organizations’ programs (ibid.).

The center became a hub for refugees and the

organizations involved in their resettlement. By studying the interaction between the
federally controlled Center and the VOLAGs with whom they worked, a clear picture of
the three different understandings of to the shadow state evolve.

The following

discussion focuses largely on the resettlement of Cuban refugees. This, as will be seen,
was one of the most important roles of the Center (representing the federal
government), and, consequently, of the VOLAGs. The communication and relationship
between governmental and nongovernmental organizations will also be explored
through this lens. Analysis of the Centers’ documents makes it clear that Geiger and
Wolch’s understanding of the shadow state is insufficient.

Trudeau’s extended

understanding and the conceptual extension suggested in this thesis are necessary to
truly understand the complex relationship between the federal government (the
Center), the VOLAGs, and the refugees themselves. An analysis of these documents
provides an ideal format through which to see the three different approaches to the
shadow state construct; Geiger and Wolch, Trudeau, and that presented in this thesis.
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Geiger and Wolch (G&W)

On March 28th 1961, William L. Mitchell, Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration, sent a letter to Marshall Wise, Director of the Cuban Refugee Center. In
the letter, he stated that the resettlement of refugees was a top priority of the Center
(Wise 1961). However, he goes on to outline a few of the major obstacles to large-scale
resettlement, such as the refugees’ desire for a quick return to Cuba, the cold climate in
the northern United States, and the possible lack of jobs for them in other cities (Wise
1961). A country as large as the United States was easily capable of handling the 1,500 –
2,000 refugees arriving per week; however Miami-Dade County alone was not.
Unsurprisingly, resettlement played a significant role in the federal government’s plan
to deal with the vast number of arriving refugees, but these efforts were plagued with
difficulties. In order to address these obstacles there were many who felt that action
needed to start at the top (Lyford 1962; vanden Heuvel 1963). Calls, such as the one
below, emphasize the top-down notion of the relationship between federal power and
local organizations.
For some Cubans active in politics, resettlement has become a dirty
word. Some of this, in the highly emotional Miami climate, was
bound to rub off on the mass of refugees. […] We have been
handicapped by our inability to get the resettlement message
through to the people who speak for the many service
organizations in the United States. […] We have reached the
conclusion that a voice stronger than ours is needed to combat this
organizational lethargy. […] Without leadership from the White
House, we feel, it would be difficult to elicit a real grass-roots
response (vanden Heuvel 1963, p. 2).
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Interestingly, this letter was written by William J. vanden Heuvel, President of
the International Rescue Committee, a national VOLAG, to John F. Thomas, Director of
the federal Cuban Refugee Program in the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare. This seems to contradict the fear of unwanted government involvement in the
nonprofit sector that Geiger and Wolch expected; however, it still represents a topdown power structure consistent with Geiger and Wolch’s conceptualization of the
shadow state.

Such observations are also evident in government memorandums,

including one written by government official Harry B. Lyford.

He states, “[the

President’s] personal action should be the key to spark action at all levels” (Lyford 1962,
p. 2). He went on to say that the “President-Governor-Mayor” approach would, in his
opinion, be the only effective means to produce positive resettlement results across the
US (Lyford 1962, p. 3).

Lyford recognized the importance of grassroots action.

However, he assumes that such action can only start from the highest level – the White
House. While such views fit well into the G&W conceptualization of the shadow state,
further reading shows that an extended understanding of the shadow state is needed to
understand the interaction of governmental and nongovernmental organizations. As
will become clear in the following section, the relationship between these entities truly
is interdependent.
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Trudeau (T)

One area of resettlement where the interdependent nature of the relationship
between the government and VOLAGs is particularly clear is the utilization of VOLAG
networks by the federal government.10

Abraham Ribicoff, Secretary of Health,

Education and Welfare, emphasizes the extent to which the government relies on the
complex national web of networks established by VOLAGs.
These agencies, with their local affiliates across the Nation, handle
the actual resettlement of Cuban refugees by methods worked out
through long experience. These include careful selection of a
destination for the refugee family – the location of sponsors to give
them personal help in getting settled – a great deal of careful
planning with the refugees and their sponsors – and much
counseling – and perhaps a long period of working with a refugee
family as it develops roots in its new home (Ribicoff 1962, p. 3).
These intra-agency networks influence future resettlement decisions. For example, the
Center agreed to pay transportation costs for refugee resettlement from Miami to any
city where the Refugee Center had affiliated agencies (Wise 1961). Later in this section
we will see how VOLAGs were instrumental in securing funding for resettlement costs;
however, here it is important to note that the pre-existence of networks guides the
financial decisions of the federal government.

Where networks are previously

established, the government is willing to cover transportation costs. Robert M. Ball,
Commissioner of Social Security, reinforces the government’s dependence on VOLAGs.
“For the all-important resettlement activity, we have depended primarily on the skill

10

A national network of service providers is a prerequisite to be contracted as an official VOLAG.
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and dedication of the voluntary agencies and their constituents around the country”
(Ball 1962, p. 21). Such constituents are found wherever Catholics, Protestants, Jewish,
or affiliates of the International Rescue Committee are found (Ribicoff 1962).
The national networks of voluntary agencies were a primary, but not a singular
strength of these organizations. Their experience in helping vulnerable populations,
such as unaccompanied children, granted them a privileged position of experience.
Such experiences made these organizations specially qualified to handle delicate
assignments, such as the support of unaccompanied children. Regarding the support
and protection of unaccompanied children, Secretary Abraham A. Ribicoff states that,
“[t]his program should make use of experienced national voluntary agencies in this
field” (Mitchell 1961a, p. 6). However, more than simply being entrusted with greater
responsibility, voluntary organizations were valued for their unparalleled knowledge
and expertise.
The importance of the voluntary agencies was not lost on Robert M. Ball,
Commissioner of Social Security, who, soon after assuming his position, called a
meeting with voluntary agency executives. In this meeting, Ball and the executives
revised resettlement policy and instituted a transition allowance to fund refugee
resettlement outside Miami (Ball 1962). This emphasizes the important role of the
voluntary agencies, that the new Secretary would call a meeting with them “soon” after
assuming his position (Ball 1962, p. 14). Furthermore, it illustrates the role of the
VOLAGs in the instituting of the transition allowance – money given to a refugee upon
being relocated to make the initial arrival easier for the refugee and the host-family.
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The Secretary goes on to say that, “We took [this] step following consultations with the
voluntary agencies associated with us in resettlement work, and we believe the
transition allowance has contributed significantly to the increase in resettlement” (Ball
1962, p. 7). The transition allowance was a recommendation made by VOLAGs, based
on feedback that they had received from refugees and potential host-families. Refugees
were uncomfortable resettling with no money to speak of, and the arrival of a refugee
put a burden on host-families who faced up-front expenses when the refugee arrived
(Ball 1962). Using their expertise, and their extensive contact with refugees and hostfamilies, the voluntary agencies recommended the implementation of a transition
allowance. The effect of this allowance was two-fold; it eased the concerns of refugees,
removing a stumbling block to resettlement, while simultaneously increasing the
number of potential host-families by addressing their immediate financial concerns.
Such expertise can come only from on-the-ground organizations, such as VOLAGs, and
was clearly appreciated by government agents, such as those at the Center.
As a result of their important role in the administration of services, their central
role in the resettlement process, and their close contact with refugees, VOLAGs became
an important source of information for Center staff. Weekly staff meetings were held at
the Cuban Refugee Center in Miami and included the heads of voluntary agencies and the
executive staff of the Center (Wise 1961).

Such meetings were instituted, “for the

exchange of ideas, and the tightening and smoothing of procedures” (Wise 1961, p. 4).
One document lists as a Basic Objective, “[c]loser coordination among the voluntary
agencies at the Center to provide an opportunity for interagency discussion of mutual
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problems” (Lazell 1962b, p. 2).

The document recommends the involvement of

representatives of resettlement agencies (VOLAGs) and government officials at all
panels that were convened to review the cases of refugees who refused to accept
resettlement opportunities outside of the Miami area (Lazell 1962b).

These panels

convene when a refugee who is invited to resettle refuses the offer, preferring to stay in
Miami. Implicit in such objectives is recognition of VOLAGs as sources of experience
and knowledge.
Such experience was appreciated in Washington D.C. as well, where voluntary
organization leaders were called to testify before Congress about the refugee program.
In one such event, Gaynor I. Jacobson, the Executive Director of United HIAS service,
testified before a Senate Subcommittee headed by Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Rosen
1966). In his testimony, the Director commended the subcommittee for revising labor
regulations that negatively impacted refugees, while simultaneously urging them to go
further (Rosen 1966). This was not a singular testimony, and in fact Jacobson testified
before the same subcommittee at a later date (Rosen 1966).

Information from the

voluntary sector reached government officials through other means than official
testimony as well. In one instance, Senator Robert Kennedy mentioned that, “various
social agencies specializing in work with refugees tell us of case after case where
companies report their special delight with their new Cuban employees” (Kennedy, R.F.
1966, p. 2, emphasis added). Such a statement is indicative of social agencies’ ability to
communicate with policymakers, and those policymakers’ willingness to use such
information to inform policy decisions.
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Committees were another method by which the voluntary sector was involved
with policymakers at a federal level.

In 1961, Tracy S. Voorhees, President

Eisenhower’s Personal Representative for Cuban Refugees, recommended the
establishment of an advisory committee on Cuban refugees (Mitchell 1961b). Speaking
of this committee, Voorhees recommended that representatives of all connected
voluntary agencies, usually the heads, be involved. Their involvement, in Voorhees’
words, would “give them all the feeling […] that they were part of it and were being
actively consulted.

Also this would tend to minimize friction between these

organizations, keep them working together as a team, and diminish labor opposition”
(Mitchell 1961b, p. 5).

This quote emphasizes a dual importance of voluntary

organization involvement at the federal level; it instills feelings of involvement, while
aiding in the efficient use of resources.
Involvement with federal agencies, whether in Washington D.C. or at the Cuban
Refugee Center in Miami, put voluntary agencies squarely in the middle of discussions
on refugee policies. Their expertise in the on-the-ground-execution of federal refugee
programs also put them in a position of advocacy for refugees when programs were not
considered to meet their real needs. One program involved with the Cuban Refugee
Center, the Christian Community Service Agency of Dade County (CCSA), sent a letter
to Harry B. Lyford of the Center stating that, “[w]e will attempt […], in our casework
service, to put pressure on the Cuban Refugee Center to meet the refugees’ needs” (Smith
1969, p. 2, emphasis added). The letter goes on to state, “[w]e will continue as an
agency to voice to the community our concern about the refugees’ plight and the staff
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will attempt to play an advocacy role with the Refugee Center and with the various
community agencies” (Smith 1969, p. 2, emphasis added). The sentiments of “pressure”
and “advocacy” expressed in these statements suggest that CCSA sees itself not as an
unwitting pawn, but rather as a partner – critical if need be - working together to
improve the services offered to refugees.
Trudeau recognized the interdependent nature of the relationship between
governmental and nongovernmental organizations. His understanding of the shadow
state goes further in explaining the complex relationships that exist in the welfare
sector. However, as I will show in the following section, a further extension of the
shadow state construct is in order.

Including Refugees in the Shadow State

Conceptual understandings of the shadow state that omit the role of refugees
leave out an important aspect of the devolution of welfare services. The conception of
the shadow state construct by Geiger and Wolch added greatly to our understanding of
the devolution of welfare services.

Trudeau correctly establishes the fact that

relationships between governmental and nongovernmental organizations are indeed
multi-directional and that governmental agencies rely on voluntary organizations for
on-the-ground information and expertise. However, Trudeau does not consider the
ability of refugees to influence this construct. It is the aim of this research to illustrate
how, through participation with voluntary organizations, refugees should be included
in an extended understanding of the shadow state. In this section, information from
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Cuban Refugee Center documents will be used to establish a historical context of refugee
involvement within the Cuban diaspora.
As mentioned previously, resettlement was a major priority of the Center. In a
1962 letter from A.A. Micocci, Staff Adviser at the Cuban Refugee Program, to Brevard
Crihfield, Secretary of the Governor’s Conference, Micocci emphasizes the need for, “all
the help we can get from all quarters” to aid in the resettlement process (Micocci 1962a,
p. 2). The resettled Cuban refugees were an important group to aid Micocci’s effort
(Barrera 1971; Cuban Refugee Center 1962; IRC 1966; Kendall 1962; Micocci 1962b;
Ribicoff 1962). In a letter sent from Marshall Wise, Director of the Cuban Refugee Center,
to resettled Cuban refugees he states,
[Y]our continued successful resettlement will pave the way to
helping us aid other Cubans to find jobs and resettlement. […]
Would you, therefore, write me of your experience in your job, of
the cooperation you received, of the assistance given you during
the first days, your impressions of your new home, surroundings,
your new life? […] If you know of other possibilities in your new
environment for resettling Cubans, please let me know (Micocci
1962b, p. 2).
In an effort to resettle other refugees, the Center turned to those who had already been
resettled for help. This was also an opportunity for resettled refugees to contact those
in charge of the Cuban Refugee Program directly. In another letter, prepared for those
ready to be resettled, J. Arthur Lazell, Deputy Director for Resettlement at the Center,
writes, “It is most important that when any problem arises, you immediately contact
your local sponsoring organization for its members will guide and counsel you”
(Micocci 1962b, p. 4). Again, refugees are provided with channels of communication; in
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this case, those channels are through their voluntary agency. Such feedback, as seen in
the preceding section, is passed on to the Center through the VOLAGs.
While much of the feedback solicited from resettled refugees was to be used in
encouraging other refugees to resettle, it was also seen as an opportunity for Cubans to
help other Cubans (Barrera 1971; Cuban Refugee Center 1962; IRC 1966; Kendall 1962;
Micocci 1962b; Ribicoff 1962). Feedback on resettled refugees reached all levels. In one
instance, Abraham Ribicoff, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, stated that,
“[r]eports about the 25,000 refugees already resettled outside Miami are good. From the
Cubans we hear about their new jobs, their new friends, and their new employers”
(Ribicoff 1962, p. 3).

Information collected by the Cuban Refugee Center included

questionnaires that inquired about the refugees’ experiences in their new cities (Cuban
Refugee Center 1962).

The center used this information to inform newly arriving

refugees about resettlement options. In one instance, Cuban personnel from the Center
organized an exhibit at the 1962 Conference of Mayors in Miami Beach (Cuban Refugee
Center 1962). These staff members were available to answer questions from attendees,
specifically about the initiation of resettlement opportunities in their communities
(Cuban Refugee Center 1962). This is a more direct form of Cubans helping Cubans, the
employment of Cubans in refugee organizations.
important part of the Cuban Refugee Center.

Cuban volunteers made up an

In a 1966 statement released by the

International Rescue Committee, one of four major VOLAGs associated with the Center,
the centrality of Cuban volunteers is made clear, “[w]e did not know that what started
as an operation staffed by Cuban volunteers [referring to the Cuban Refugee Center] would
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grow into a permanent set-up” (IRC 1966, p. 1, emphasis added). Further evidence of
the centrality of Cubans’ role in the resettlement of newly arrived Cuban refugees come
from a letter sent from Howard H. Palmatier, Deputy Director of the Cuban Refugee
Program, to Raul Lastra, President of the Organization of Cuban Educators in Exile, in
1969. In this letter Palmatier states,
I do want to underline, however, that we rely greatly on the
goodwill and cooperation of Cubans in the United States – be they
refugees, or long-time residents of this country. They have
provided valuable assistance to newcomers and we earnestly seek
their continued assistance (Palmatier 1969, p. 1).
The role of Cubans in assisting refugees is further emphasized in a statement made by
Lazell, Deputy Director of the Cuban Refugee Center, in a letter to Commissioner William
Mitchell, of the Social Security Administration, in which he states,
The greatest need at the Center and within the agencies is sufficient
personnel for objective counseling of refugees prior to their
departure from Miami, persons who know the United States and
refugee psychology. Cuban personnel cannot do this work adequately
(Lazell 1962a, p. 2, emphasis added).
From this quote we learn two important details.

First, that Cubans are already

beginning to make up part of the personnel in these organizations. Second, we learn
that they are considered adequate for some work, i.e. manning an exhibit and
answering questions from the public, and inadequate for other work, i.e. counseling
refugees preparing for resettlement. This phenomenon will be explored in greater
detail later in this thesis. However, it is of great significance that Cubans came to
occupy

positions

within

these

organizations

–

both

governmental

and

nongovernmental. The role of refugees in refugee organizations is, as will be argued
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later, the primary manner by which refugees can exert the greatest influence on the
refugee program.
As seen in the previous section, refugees make up a significant portion of the
staff of refugee organizations.

Nevertheless, non-refugees make up part of the

personnel and, through daily contact with refugees, can provide important insights into
refugee concerns. Lasa, a staff member at the Center and Liaison for the Miami Cuban
Community, took advantage of the daily contact between non-refugee personnel at the
Cuban Refugee Center and refugees, to survey non-refugee employees regarding the
refugees’ main objections to resettlement outside of Miami. Lasa then addressed these
main objections in a letter campaign to refugees in the Miami area (Cuban Refugee
Center 1962). Lasa used information gleaned by Center personnel from refugees to
better address refugee concerns.

He also received, “Cuban refugee groups and

individuals that come to the Director’s office with complaints, problems, etc.” (Cuban
Refugee Center 1962, p. 5).
What is clear from the Cuban Refugee Center documents is that, whether through
voluntary organizations or the Center itself, channels of communication are open to
refugees. Furthermore, as illustrated by the following quote, such channels are used.
“Many Cubans say that they want to stay in Miami so that they can get back to Cuba
quickly when the time comes […] the United States will get them back there promptly,
as soon as it is possible for them to return to Cuba” (Ribicoff 1962, p. 6). This quote,
from the person in charge of all refugee operations in the United States, shows a
knowledge and understanding of refugee concerns – namely the concern of straying too
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far from Miami. In response to this sentiment, the refugee program instituted a return
clause in all resettlement agreements to alleviate this concern.11 Other instances of
refugee involvement are abundant in the documents. For example, in a Congressional
Subcommittee meeting, the New York Association for New Americans, which served
Cuban-Jewish refugees who settled in metropolitan New York, suggested the provision
of grants or loans to aid exile professionals in re-validating their credentials, allowing
them to practice their profession in the US (Soskis 1966).

Philip Soskis, Executive

Director of the program, continued:
For some of the professionally trained men and women such as
pharmacists or dentists, there has been a great deal of
discouragement because they have been unable to resume practice
in their own specialty in the United States. […] I am pleased that
the Committee will be able to hear direct testimony from one of our
former clients, Mrs. Regina Perez, who […] will describe how she
and her husband have been able to use their former skills (Soskis
1966, p. 9).
Mrs. Perez, as well as other Cuban refugees, was able to voice her experiences
and concerns directly to a Congressional Subcommittee through the voluntary agency
that aided her upon arriving to the United States. Personal testimony, such as that
given by Mrs. Perez, was welcomed by the subcommittee. In his opening statement the
Chairman of the subcommittee, Edward Kennedy, stated that,
“[w]e are happy to have with us today several witnesses, including
a number of resettled Cuban refugees, who will relate their
experiences with the resettlement program. […] We hope that the
on-location hearings […] will […] put the Subcommittee and the
entire Congress in a better position to make recommendations and
11

The clause guaranteed return passage to Miami if and when the Castro regime fell.
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pass legislation for the benefit of all concerned” (Kennedy, E.M.
1966, p. 2).

Cuban professionals also took the initiative to form their own organizations. In
one instance, a group of exiled Cuban lawyers organized as the “National Association
of Cuban Lawyers” (Quifiones 1969). They used this organization to request a meeting
with the Director of the Cuban Refugee Center, Ballafonte, to discuss their needs and
concerns (i.e. revalidation of credentials) (Quifiones 1969). Other organizations, such as
the Cuban Hebrew Circle in Miami – a “self-help organization of Cuban refugees” -,
were formed by Cubans for the mutual strengthening of Cuban refugees (United HIAS
Service 1967, p. 5). This self-motivation attracted the attention of public servants and
welfare organizations alike who considered Cubans to be invaluable employees. In one
example, Senator Robert Kennedy relates the experience of James Dumpson, a former
New York City Welfare Commissioner, who “went to Miami and recruited a number of
Cuban refugees to serve as case workers and investigators for the Welfare Department”
(Kennedy, R.F. 1966, p. 4).

Senator Robert Kennedy recommends that other

departments in New York City consider following Dumpson’s example, stating that,
“[o]ur city government should be as responsive as it can be to the needs of our Spanishspeaking citizens” (Kennedy, R.F. 1966, p. 4).
The feedback to the federal level, where legislation concerning refugees is made,
is a key component of the ways in which refugees influence refugee-related policy.
Voluntary

organizations

often

serve

as

the

platform

through

which

such

communication occurs, as illustrated in the following example. In April of 1966, the
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New York Association for New Americans testified before a Congressional
Subcommittee (Soskis 1966). In this testimony, they stated that Cuban refugees were
putting down deep roots in the United States, but that in order to fully adjust they
would have to be offered a path to permanent residency and citizenship (Soskis 1966).
The testimony states,
We do, therefore, hope that your Committee will find ways and
means of recommending the necessary measures to Congress so
that the status of the individuals can be regularized and they can
attain the responsibilities and privileges of citizenship in the United
States for which they have a deep longing (Soskis 1966, p. 10).
One member of that subcommittee was Senator Robert Kennedy, who stated that same
day,
[W]e must take legislative action to clear up an unfortunate
anomaly regarding the legal status of our Cuban friends who are in
this country. Under the law, they are admitted as “parolees.” This
means that because they have not come into this country under the
usual immigration procedures, they cannot become permanent
resident aliens – and therefore eligible for citizenship – unless they
first leave the country, go elsewhere, and reapply for admission
through the normal channels and under the normal priorities. I
believe this is unfortunate (Kennedy, R.F. 1966, p. 4).
Later that year, on November 2, 1966, Congress passed the “Cuban Adjustment Act,”
which allowed thousands of Cubans to adjust their status from “parolee” (temporary
permission to be in the US) to Lawful Permanent Resident (permanent permission to
reside in the US) (USCIS).

This is one example that indicates that voluntary

organizations are familiar with the needs of Cuban refugees. They presented the needs
of their clients before Congress, contributing to a new law that was passed just months
afterwards.
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Fundamental to an understanding of the shadow state construct is the notion
that voluntary organizations provide communication channels for refugees. I have
already discussed channels, such as letter campaigns and government-administered
questionnaires (through the federal Cuban Refugee Center). Questionnaires administered
by VOLAGs to their former clients is another example. Earlier I discussed the New
York Association for New Americans testimony before Congress. In the testimony, the
organization stated that Cubans were putting down roots in the United States and that
their legal status had to be regularized before full adjustment could take place (Soskis
1966). This information was gleaned from a survey administered to 100 families by the
organization (ibid.). The association stated that the survey gave them the opportunity
to renew contacts with past clients, determining how they had adjusted to life in the US
(ibid.).

This survey, conducted through interviews and home visits, provided the

organization with information directly from refugees (ibid.).
Surveys administered by voluntary organizations provide invaluable feedback to
the federal government. Such surveys are also of great use to voluntary organizations.
One such survey, conducted by the United States Catholic Conference (USCC),
requested that individual Diocesan Resettlement Directors and Directors of Special
Cuban Refugee Committees, send a “Family Survey” questionnaire (see Appendix 1) to
Cuban refugee families (McCarthy 1967).

This survey was designed to obtain,

“personal observations of our program” to “improve and reevaluate our Cuban
Refugee Program” (McCarthy 1967, p.1). In a letter sent to questionnaire participants in
1967 (see Appendix 2), the USCC states that, “In our constant endeavor to give better
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service […] we prepare many studies and seek a great deal of expert advice. In order to
help us help your fellow countrymen more efficiently and effectively, please fill out the
enclosed ‘Family Survey’” (McCarthy 1967, p.2).

The “Family Survey” included

questions about the family’s adjustment and about the service that they received from
the organization. For example, the survey asked participants, “What problems did you
find to be the most difficult in resettling in this country?”, “Please tell us frankly how
the services you received from our organization […] were helpful to you and your
family.

If not helpful, please Explain.”, “What other services would have been of

additional help in your beginning here?”, and finally, “We hope you will add any other
information you believe will be helpful to our understanding of your life in this
country” (McCarthy 1967, pp. 5-6). Such questions provide refugees with a direct
channel of communication to organizations. As we have seen, voluntary organizations
can and do use feedback from refugees to address concerns on both an organizational
and federal level.
Finally, federal agencies such as the Cuban Refugee Program, utilized
questionnaires as well. In a letter sent to Wise, Director of the Cuban Refugee Center, on
the 14th of February 1963, John F. Thomas, Director of the Cuban Refugee Program,
states that, “A questionnaire is being circulated tomorrow by the Cuban Revolutionary
Council to the members of Brigade 2506 [Brigade involved in the Bay of Pigs] to
determine their needs and desires” (Thomas 1963, p. 12, emphasis added). Channels of
communication, while mostly easily accessed through voluntary organizations, were
even available between the federal government and refugees. The existence of such
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channels strongly supports, as argued here, the extension of the shadow state to include
refugees.
Resettlement documents provide a clear lens through which to understand the
relationship between governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Resettlement
was the primary objective of the federally instituted Center, and voluntary
organizations were the tools by which that objective was executed. Such a relationship
is in line with the shadow state construct as understood by Geiger and Wolch.
However, further investigation reveals an interdependent relationship between these
organizations, just as Trudeau would expect.

Clear channels of communication

between refugees and organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental, support
an extended understanding of the shadow state construct, as argued in this thesis.

Catholic Charities – Miami, FL

Introduction

Catholic Charities USA (CCUSA) was founded in 1910 to advocate for social
justice (Catholic Charities 2011a). They have “served as a national advocate for the
most vulnerable in our nation, including children, the elderly, the disabled, [and]
immigrants” (Catholic Charities 2011b). According to the 2009 Catholic Charities at a
Glance report, CCUSA received 67% of their revenue from the government (Catholic
Charities 2009). With this funding, CCUSA supports local agencies through advocacy,
networking, training, financial support and leadership (Catholic Charities 2011a). The
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Refugee Resettlement Program of Catholic Charities in Miami is one of many local
organizations that CCUSA supports.
The following section will be broken into three subsections. They explore three
ways in which refugees can and do participate in the Refugee Resettlement Program,
and ultimately in the refugee process as a whole. The three sections will be Feedback,
Experience, and Becoming Part of the Organization.

Feedback

Volunteer organizations allow, even encourage, participation from refugees in
many ways. Feedback is a primary method through which refugees influence the
provision of services, and even what services are available. I observed feedback from
refugees, sometimes solicited and sometimes simply received, in a variety of settings. I
will discuss several methods of feedback in this section.
In October 2008, voluntary organizations involved in the resettlement of Cuban
refugees in Miami produced a film for the United States Interest Section in Havana
entitled, Tu Nueva Vida en Estados Unidos: Consejos de cubanos en Miami (Your New Life
in the United States: Advice from Cubans in Miami). This film is intended to provide
Cuban refugees who prepare to come to the United States advice regarding their new
life.

The almost two hour long video is comprised of interviews with VOLAG

employees and refugees (we will see later that these two groups are hardly mutually
exclusive). The video explains the refugee process and the programs that will be at
their disposal. However, a significant portion of the video is devoted to refugees who
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already are in Miami. Early on in the video the narrator, a member of the Miami
VOLAG community, says, “Les preguntamos a muchos de los refugiados [Cubanos]
que consejos les hubiera gustado escuchar antes de venir a los Estados Unidos” (We
asked many of the [Cuban] refugees what counsel they would have liked to hear before
coming to the United States) (Programa de Refugiados 2008, 35:55). The subsequent
section of the video is devoted to Cuban refugees in Miami who offer their advice,
based on their experience, to those who are preparing for life in the United States.
Beyond the obvious influence of already resettled refugees on new refugees, they were
also influencing voluntary organizations. This was an opportunity for those who are
served by VOLAGs to provide direct feedback to the agencies at their disposal.
Furthermore, the agencies listened to this feedback, because they included advice of
Cuban refugees in the video. By allowing current refugees to express what they wished
they had known before arriving in the US (something that apparently was not
addressed adequately by their VOLAG), the VOLAG is addressing that issue more
clearly with future refugees.
The use of resettled refugees is a significant part of the video. However, the
refugees also serve the needs of the organization. In one part of the video, recently
resettled refugees talk about the advantages of resettlement outside of Miami. The
refugees share stories of acquaintances that have relocated outside of Miami, and the
benefits that they have received as a result of their relocation.12 Interestingly though,

Refugees who resettle outside Miami receive more generous resettlement aid because they do not
generally have family to support them.
12
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the video only portrays Cuban refugees in Miami. This is of great concern to MiamiDade County.

The County is closed to refugee resettlement outside of family

reunification – a response to the enormous number of refugees who already resettled in
the County. That these refugees would even be speaking about relocation emphasizes
the importance of their recommendation and speaks to the influence that past refugees
can have on future refugees. This, however, is not a controlling top-down use of power
by VOLAGs over refugees.

There is a strong interdependence between voluntary

organizations and the families of Cuban refugees in Miami. One cannot fully succeed
without the other – a point addressed throughout the video by VOLAG employees.
One such employee, speaking of the family and the Cuban community in Miami, put it
this way, “[La familia es] una mano de ayuda muy importante para nosotros. […]. La
comunidad [Cubana] ha sido muy util en el proceso de reasentamiento Cubano” ([The
family is] a very important helping hand for us. […] The [Cuban] community has been
very useful in the Cuban resettlement process) (Programa de Refugiados 2008, 13:00).
The agencies in Miami depend on help from families to support newly arrived refugees.
The financial assistance received by the refugee helps to offset the costs incurred by the
family, but the family provides the foundation for successful resettlement. This does
not preclude the role of the VOLAG, and in fact refugees are counseled by past-refugees
to stay in close contact with their agency (Programa de Refugiados 2008, 12:12).
VOLAGs are an important part of a newly arrived refugees’ life.

One VOLAG

employee put it this way, “Esta oficina [Catholic Charities] y todo los de mas que
trabajan con refugiados [VOLAGs] son sus aliados, son sus amigos” (This organization
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[Catholic Charities] and all who work with refugees [VOLAGs] are your allies, your
friends) (Programa de Refugiados 2008, 7:55). The video goes on to implore refugees to
stay in contact, to use their case worker’s wisdom. “Es muy importante que antes de
hacer nada […] que le pregunten a la persona que lo intrevistó porque la pesona lleva
tiempo aqui [y] le va a decir lo mejor para usted” (It is very important that before you
do anything that you ask the person who interviewed you, because that person has
experience and will know what is best for you) (Programa de Refugiados 2008, 8:40).
The “interview” referred to is the “intake interview.” This is a refugee’s first contact
with their local agency, and the beginning of their relationship with their case worker.13
The relationship between a refugee, or client, and the case worker is the first
contact a refugee will have in the US. The case worker’s role often extends beyond the
ninety days of government funded resettlement services as a friend and a counselor.
The “intake interview” is the first meeting and an important opportunity for refugees to
be prepared to provide feedback. The interview serves two important functions for the
establishment of future feedback.

The first is the establishment of channels of

communications and a relationship of trust. The second is the provision of insightful
case management to provide services tailored to the need of the individual refugee.
The establishment of communication channels with the organization is perhaps
the most important step that refugees can take towards influencing the services that are
provided to them.

13

These channels are opened during the intake interview when

Each refugee is assigned a designated case worker.
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refugees are informed of their rights, including the right to complain, by their case
worker. During one such interview that I observed in Catholic Charities, the case
worker asked a new client to read the contract between herself and the organization out
loud, ensuring complete understanding of her rights and obligations. The refugees’
right to complain is one channel of communication between themselves and their case
workers. However, the right to complain would be of little use without a relationship
of trust. This is another integral part of the intake interview. Such trust is built by an
organization through the careful and insightful management of cases. Each refugee
arrives with different needs and it is the case worker’s responsibility to recognize those
needs, even if they are not expressed by the refugee, and to address them. During one
intake interview that I observed at Catholic Charities, the refugees, a young mother and
daughter, were being resettled with a local family member. This family member did
not have any form of transportation, nor the ability to arrange transportation. The case
worker, through observation, began to arrange a bus pass that is not generally provided
at this early stage. After this particular interview, I asked the Volunteer Coordinator if
such flexibility was common place in the organization. He informed me that this case
worker’s action was quite common and encouraged. He went on to explain that no two
cases were alike and that each case worker is encouraged to tailor services to meet the
needs of each client. Such special arrangements, he continued, had to be approved by
the bosses, but that this was hardly ever an issue.

Any help that contributes to

employment and/or independence, the two primary goals of the program, is always
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considered – help with rent, down payments, additional education, etc.14 Such insight
depends on perceptive case workers, and as will be explored later in this thesis, is
greatly aided by the refugee experiences of most workers.
This flexibility and perceptiveness aids in the establishment of relationships of
trust, and therefore encourages the use of established channels of communication. As
individual refugees use those channels to voice concerns, or to ask for assistance, the
organization becomes aware of the issues that refugees face.

In one particularly

important instance, it came to the attention of the Program that local employers were
not hiring certain refugees because of a misunderstanding of employment
documentation. In this particular instance it is important to highlight the difference
between political prisoners and parolees. Political prisoners enter the US as “refugees,”
while parolees are considered “entrants.” The majority of Cubans entering the US are
“entrants,” and therefore require an Employment Authorization Document (EAD) in
order to work. Refugees, on the other hand, do not require an EAD, because their status
automatically confers work authorization.

However, local employers had become

accustomed to the EAD, and were wary of employing anyone who did not posses one.
Refugees, who do not require an EAD, were turned away by employers afraid of hiring
anyone without an EAD. The Program became aware of this when refugees contacted
their case workers about this problem.

Local VOLAGs brought this issue to the

attention of government authorities and a statement was issued, explaining the
The two main goals of Catholic Charities are employment and independence. Independence refers to
economic and social independence (i.e. moving around the city alone).
14
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situation to local employers.

This example highlights the important role of

organizations to advocate for refugees, but more importantly, it highlights the role of
refugee feedback in addressing the needs and concerns of the refugee community.
Voluntary organizations work together to address issues, such as the
aforementioned EAD problem. Feedback from refugees is received by case workers,
who in turn bring it to the attention of their organization. The organization, in turn, can
share it with the VOLAG community through monthly meetings of the VOLAG
Consortium (Consortium). These monthly meetings are an important opportunity for
members of the VOLAG community to address issues that were brought to their
attention by refugees.

Likewise, it is an opportunity to meet with leaders from

governmental departments, such as the Department of Health and the Department of
Children and Families. A review of minutes from five months of meetings (JanuaryMay, 2010) reveals multiple instances of refugee feedback that informed VOLAG and
governmental action.
In the February 2010 meeting minutes, a member of one of the VOLAGs
expressed a concern regarding elderly refugees. The Department of Social Security no
longer sends a letter to refugees who qualify for Supplemental Security Income (SSI).
Elderly refugees will not receive SSI without submitting an application, and the letter
served as a reminder to refugees that they had to apply for SSI (South Florida VOLAG
Consortium).

The VOLAG member had been made aware of a concern, the

discontinuation of a SSI reminder letter, and brought that concern to the Consortium.
In order to rectify this situation the Consortium agreed on the “importance of re58

installing a relationship with Social Security Office […] [because] with all the new
regulations we should have someone to raise our concerns” (South Florida VOLAG
Consortium, p. 3, emphasis added). In order to reinstall this relationship, the members
of the Consortium suggest a liaison person within Social Security who can advocate for
the needs of the VOLAG community and their clients.
One of the interesting elements of the Consortium is that it serves as a platform
by which the VOLAG community can interact with governmental agencies. On one
level, it involves the direct participation of governmental agencies, i.e. the Department
of Health and the Department of Children and Families. On another level, it involves
the scaling up of refugee concerns to the federal level of the Social Security office and,
as I will show below, the Department of Motor Vehicles.
Refugees are vulnerable due to their limited resources and relative lack of
experience in a new country. Unfortunately, there are people who take advantage of
this. In the April 2010 minutes we learn of such an incidence. A worker from Episcopal
Migration Ministries (EMM) recounted an incident involving one of her clients at a local
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). Due to discrepancies in the name of the refugee
on several legal documents, the DMV worker refused to grant her a driver license.
However, the refugee was able to obtain a driver license by paying someone at the
DMV $100 (South Florida VOLAG Consortium).

Another worker, from the

International Rescue Committee (IRC) voiced a similar concern from one of her clients.
All in attendance agreed that, “Issues like these are happening every day” (ibid., p. 2).
To address these issues, the VOLAGs agreed to bring these issues to the attention of the
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DMV Liaison at the next Refugee Task Force Meeting (ibid.). This case reinforces the
chain of communication, extending from the refugee, through their VOLAG, and
ultimately to the respective governmental agency.

However, the case also makes

reference to yet another tool through which VOLAGs can voice the concerns of their
clients – the Refugee Task Force Meeting. These are regional bi-monthly meetings
hosted by the State of Florida Department of Children and Families. These meetings, as
referenced above, provide the VOLAG community access to the governmental
departments necessary to address the concerns of refugees.
The VOLAG Consortium and the Refugee Task Force Meetings allow the
VOLAGs to voice the concerns of their clients to other VOLAGs and governmental
officials. Neither of these meetings directly involves refugees. Miami-Dade County is
addressing this through the creation of the Miami-Dade County Refugee Advisors
Panel (MDRAP). The MDRAP serves under the direction of the Florida Department of
Children and Families’ Director of Refugee Services Program. The panel’s role is to
provide feedback to the Director regarding refugee services and issues and concerns
that refugees face. Beyond the Director, the panel serves as a resource for voluntary
agencies and local government as well (MDRAP 2009). The MDRAP’s mission is to
serve as an advisory panel to the Refugee Services program, facilitating a smoother
resettlement process for newly arriving refugees (ibid.).

The role of the Refugee

Advisors (panel members) is six fold:
1. Help identify and prioritize refugee concerns and issues;
2. Provide feedback on the suitability and helpfulness of
services provided to refugees by RS funded providers;
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3. Recommend policies, plans and procedures to promote
effective delivery of services;
4. Identify the particular needs of older refugees, children, and
other refugees with special needs;
5. Share materials and information relating to refugee matters
among panel members;
6. Be prepared to participate in the local Refugee Task Force to
inform service providers of the needs or concerns of the
refugee communities and to share information learned at the
Task Force with other refugees.

According to the panel guidelines, the thirteen members of the panel should include
newly arrived refugees and those who have benefited from the refugee program within
the past three years (ibid.).
The MDRAP is the newest channel of communication between refugees and their
governmental and nongovernmental service providers. As we have seen in this section,
there are a plethora of channels for refugees to provide feedback and to participate in
the resettlement process. While these channels generally exist through resettlement
agencies, the MDRAP provides an example of how refugees can provide direct
feedback.

Experience

In each of the aforementioned cases, it is beneficial for prospective refugees to
learn from the experiences of refugees in the US. For example, the orientation video
provided newly arrived refugees an opportunity to share their experience with those
who have yet to arrive. Case workers who were previous refugees also capitalize on
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their personal experiences to help others. I will explore the role of experience in the
shadow state in this section.
As previously mentioned, refugees are encouraged to stay in close contact with
their case worker. The video, discussed in the last section, emphasized the importance
of experience. For example, at one point in the video VOLAG employees encouraged
new refugees to consult with their case workers because they have already been
through the resettlement experience (Programa de Refugiados 2008, 9:00). Most case
workers were refugees themselves and have, personally, passed through the same
program that current clients are navigating.

Moreover, through their work with

refugees, VOLAG employees are aware of issues that most refugees will encounter. The
video encourages refugees to ask their case worker for advice regarding everything,
from continuing education programs to employment options, because their case worker
often knows others who have participated in the same programs (Programa de
Refugiados 2008, 7:55). Refugees come to rely on the organization as they would on
family for advice and support. One refugee interviewed in the video, in reference to his
voluntary agency, states that, “No he extrañado mis relaciones in Cuba porque me
siento en casa” (I have not missed my relations in Cuba because I feel at home [in the
US]) (Programa de Refugiados 2008, 11:57).

One VOLAG employee provides

encouragement to new refugees by emphasizing the fact that, “Todos hemos
comenzado igual” (We all started the same [as refugees]) (Programa de Refugiados
2008, 52:58).

Past experiences have come to define the approach that many case
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workers take in helping current refugees. This was particularly obvious in the weekly
job seminars that were held at the Refugee Resettlement Program of Catholic Charities.
Every Monday, the Program holds a job seminar that is hosted by one of the
agency’s employment specialists. Each new refugee is required to attend this seminar
once, generally the first Monday that it is offered after their arrival. This seminar is
meant to provide the refugees with a brief orientation to employment in the United
States. During my time with the organization I participated in three job seminars. Two
of these seminars were held by a Cuban employment specialist, while the other was
given by a non-Cuban specialist. An analysis of how these specialists approached the
job seminar provides insight into how having been a refugee oneself influences how
services are rendered.
The influence of the refugee experience on Valeria, the Cuban employment
specialist, was immediately clear.15 “Yo, [como soy Cubana] lo veo desde el punto de
vista de mi experiencia” (Me, [as I am Cuban] I see things from the point of view of my
experience). Valeria’s point of view is that of a Cuban refugee who has sat in the same
chairs as those who attend her seminars. She uses her experience to bond with the
refugees over their shared experiences, life in Cuba and life as an exile. These shared
experiences allow Valeria to use her personal knowledge of Cuba to tailor her seminar
to those in attendance. To Valeria, her experience as a refugee is an integral part of how
she teaches her seminars. In her seminars, Valeria relates her personal experiences and

15

Names have been changed to protect the privacy of participants in this study.
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discusses issues that she knows will be most relevant.

One such issue was job

interviews. Valeria asked if anybody had ever applied for a job or participated in a job
interview, but none had. Valeria already knew the answer to this question, but by
asking she affirmed her knowledge of Cuba, and thereby affirmed her qualification to
teach the seminar. Valeria knows that, coming from a communist country where job
interviews do not exist, none in attendance have ever participated in a job interview.
This, as we will see later, is a point that escaped Valeria’s non-Cuban colleague
Santiago. She took the attendees step by step through the job application process. This
involved many steps that non-Cubans would take for granted. For example, she taught
them how to ask for and fill out a job application. She went on to explain, primarily to
the women in attendance, that daily household skills (i.e. childcare, cleaning, cooking,
etc.) are valuable job skills.

As a Cuban, Valeria understood that the women in

attendance did not feel that they were qualified to work. However, because of her
Cuban background, she knew that this was a concern and addressed it.

She also

stressed that self-employment was legal in the US, and that they did not need to fear
legal repercussions for entrepreneurship.

This issue could only be understood by

someone who is familiar with Cuba, and it emphasizes the importance of the teacher’s
understanding of the background of her clients.

In one instance, Valeria told the

attendees that they needed to get out and explore the city. She mentioned that she
knows that their families have told them that they cannot go out alone, but that is not
true. This struck the refugees, who had indeed been told by their families that the
streets were too dangerous to go out alone. She encouraged them to start driving, but
64

to avoid the interstate, which would be too complicated to use right away. This is
another example of how Valeria used her experience as a refugee to tailor her message.
Leaving the house alone, driving on the interstate, and the job application process were
all issues that affected her resettlement, and therefore these issues have become part of
her job seminar. Valeria used her own experience to alter the standard mandatory job
seminar to address issues that Cuban refugees are most likely to encounter.
The job seminar with Valeria’s colleague, Santiago, was an entirely different
experience. It was immediately clear that Santiago was not from Cuba (he was from
Central America) and that he was not a refugee. He did not make reference to his own
experience. This was a great difference from the majority of employees in the Program
who were Cuban, and who referenced their own experiences frequently. Santiago
started his seminar by addressing the expectations of those present. He told them that
things will not be easy, but that it will not do anyone any good to “paint things rosy.”
Instead of focusing on feelings and experiences, his seminar focused largely on the legal
aspects of working in the US. Santiago explained, clearly and concisely, the benefits
afforded to legal workers in the US, such as social security, workers compensation,
overtime, and unemployment. In order to receive these benefits, he explained, an
employee has to be legal. He continued to explain the tax system and the importance of
taxes in funding social programs, such as the ones aiding them. Santiago also explained
the employment system in the US so that those in attendance could understand. After
the seminar, Santiago explained to me that he felt that not being Cuban was an
advantage. He felt that Cuban employees were too concerned about the refugees,
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painting a rosy picture of a harsh reality.

Not having been a refugee, Cuban or

otherwise, hindered his ability to connect with participants. A cultural disconnect was
apparent on a few occasions. In one instance, Santiago asked how far people had to
walk to go to a job interview in Cuba. This question was met with confused looks and
silence. Cubans, coming from a communist country, do not interview for jobs. By
assuming that the refugees had participated in job interviews, Santiago did not address
this issue to a great extent in his seminar. In another instance, Santiago discredited
housework, and work in Cuba in general, as valid work experience. He emphasized
that work experience is experience in the US, not Cuba. This was a direct contradiction
of Valeria’s view. Santiago was more susceptible to cultural missteps. One time he
randomly assigned the name “Hotel Fidel” to a fictitious place of employment. This
was met with looks of shock and surprise from the newly arrived refugees. While
Santiago presented important information in a clear and effective manner, his cultural
disconnectedness and non-refugee status made the seminar less personable and harder
to digest for the attendees. While Valeria’s seminar was engaging and personable,
Santiago’s was met with silence. At one point Santiago even pressed for questions,
warning that silence was only prejudicial to the participants themselves. Ultimately,
Valeria was able to use her own refugee experience and knowledge of Cuba to build a
relationship of trust with the participants. Furthermore, she possesses a keen insight
into what refugees are most concerned about and understands how to address those
concerns. Overall, Santiago presented important information, as the program requires,
but the experience and knowledge of Valeria contributed to a lively seminar and a
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comfortable environment. Many who were involved with resettlement organizations in
Miami were refugees. The following section will explore the influence of refugees on
the resettlement agencies by becoming part of the organizations.

Becoming Part of the Organization

Many past refugees are employed by resettlement programs in Miami. They use
their refugee experience to help new arrivals and to tailor available services to best meet
the needs of their clients.

I will now describe biographies of Hiram Ruiz, Raul

Hernandez, and Luisa Lois, who are involved in the refugee resettlement program at
different levels. Their stories differ, but they are all Cuban exiles, and they use their
refugee experience in their current work. The vignettes are based on autobiographical
excerpts.
Hiram Ruiz
Hiram Ruiz is the Director of Refugee Services in the Florida
Department of Children and Families.
Born in Cuba and raised in Miami, Ruiz holds a Master of Social
Work degree from Florida State University. He spent 8 years as a
social worker in predominantly immigrant neighborhoods in
London, England and was later a social worker in Vietnamese
refugee resettlement centers in Scotland and England. Ruiz then
spent three years with […] the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees [UNHCR], first in [the] UNHCR’s Social Service Office in
Mogadishu, Somalia assisting urban Ethiopian refugees and then in
Darfur, Sudan, as a field officer in refugee camps. After returning
to the United States, Ruiz joined the D.C. Government’s Refugee
Program.
Ruiz subsequently spent 16 years as a senior policy analyst with the
U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR), a private, Washington, D.C.67

based refugee advocacy and public information group. In that
capacity, Ruiz traveled to more than 40 countries in Africa, Asia,
and Latin America to assess the needs of refugees and internally
displaced persons and advocate for adequate U.S. and international
responses. Ruiz authored more than 20 publications on refugees
and was a staff writer for USCR’s World Refugee Survey and Refugee
Reports.
He spoke at numerous national and international
conferences and testified before Congressional Committees. Ruiz
later served as Director of Communications for USCR and its
parent organization, Immigration and Refugee Services of America,
now USCRI.
In 2004, Ruiz returned to Miami as a political director for the
Service Employees International Union. In October 2008, Ruiz was
appointed director of DCF’s Refugee Services Program, the largest
refugee program in the United States (Ruiz 2010).
This biography provides a brief introduction to Hiram Ruiz and his
accomplishments since he arrived in the US as a refugee. Hiram, a Cuban, has been a
refugee twice in his life, once under the Batista regime, and the second time under
Castro (Spangler 2008). Regarding his experience as a refugee, Hiram stated “There
wasn’t very much by way of services. Basically we got here, were given entry to the
U.S., papers to be able to be here […] but it was definitely tough, and it wasn’t tough for
months, it was tough for years” (Spangler 2008, p. 2). He has since worked with
refugees around the world. As Director of Refugee Services for the Florida Department
of Children and Families, a major goal of Hiram has been to bring refugee services
closer to the refugees (Crucet 2008; Spangler 2008). He realized this goal, in part, by
physically moving the office of Refugee Services from Tallahassee to Miami, Florida
(where approximately 80% of refugees in Florida reside) (Crucet 2008; Spangler 2008).
Hiram emphasized that the move was indicative of the Department’s commitment to
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respond to the needs of refugees and to be more directly involved in the refugee
community (Crucet 2008).

He also instituted the Miami-Dade County Refugee

Advisors Panel (MDRAP), discussed earlier in this paper. Hiram has used his own
experience as a refugee, and his years of experience working with refugees around the
world, to emphasize the shared experiences of refugees across the globe. The shared
experience of exile is a strong uniting force, and one that has drawn many refugees into
careers with VOLAGs, such as Catholic Charities.
Dr. Raul E. Hernandez
Raul E. Hernandez came to the U.S. from Cuba in 1980 as part of
the Mariel boat lift. He received a medical doctor degree from the
University of Havana. Since his arrival in the country [US] he has
worked in refugee resettlement. In 1980, he was hired by the
University of Miami as camp manager of the Unaccompanied
Minors Program serving Mariel Cuban children in Indiantown
Gap, Pennsylvania. During 1980 and 1981, he worked for HHS [the
Department of Health and Human Services], the Cuban Haitian
Task force, and a number of voluntary agencies processing Cuban
Mariel arrivals at the refugee camp created in Fort Chaffee,
Arkansas.
From 1981 through 2007, Dr. Hernandez worked for Migration and
Refugee Services of the United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops (MRS/USCCB) [holding] numerous responsibilities at the
Arkansas Regional Office; New York City; and the Washington, DC
national headquarters. He headed a number of national programs,
including the Resettlement of Cuban entrants; Match Grant and
Wilson Fish employment programs; Unaccompanied Refugee
Minors; building refugee processing capacity in Haiti; moving
Cuban/Haitian minors out the Guantanamo’s U.S. Naval Base;
resettling Kurdish-Iraqi asylees; and developing Refugee Mental
Health Programs. During his tenure he represented USCCB at
numerous national and international events. In 1996, he consulted
with the Center for Applied Linguistics for the publication of
“Cubans, their History and Culture”.
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Before his retirement from MRS/USCCB in 2007, he led the
Cuban/Haitian Program in Miami for 15 years. He is currently the
Volunteer and Resource Manager of the Refugee Program of
Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Miami (Hernandez 2009).
Raul Hernandez has worked with refugees across the United States since his
arrival in 1980. Describing this moment he writes:
It was a breezy glorious day and the shore line was visible in the
distance. […] After the years of repression, persecution,
discrimination and fear, the feeling of actually being in the US was
simply beyond description. It was May 21, 1980. We had arrived,
and we were free! (Hernandez 2010).
As the Volunteer and Resource Manager of the Refugee Program of Catholic Charities
of the Archdioceses of Miami, Raul was my primary contact. His refugee experience
has instilled in him a great empathy for other refugees, making him a strong advocate
for them. He confirmed that many former refugees work in the Program and similar
organizations. One example is Luisa.
Luisa Lois
[My] family decided […] to apply to the Program of Visas for
Political Prisoners because my father was being persecuted for not
supporting the Revolution and spent many years in prison. In 2005
after two years of waiting, we traveled to the United States as
Refugees. […] We were assigned to Catholic Charities as new
arrivals. When the case manager that worked with me during this
process saw my university and language degrees he informed me
that there was an opening for a Case Manager position in the office.
Needless to say that like every immigrant, I did not understand
much the first days…but with the English that I brought with me
and the help from my Job Developer, we completed the [resume]
that opened the doors to a new life of work and life in Catholic
Charities. The process of interviews took three months. […] I was
chosen and started immediately as Case Manager for the CubanHaitian Entrant-Program. It was very instructive to work with
people who had just arrived like me! What could I tell them? Well
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that itself…I arrived three months ago as well! They couldn’t
believe it! I progressively learned the work and was promoted to a
position of Case Manager of the Match Grant Program only three
months after starting in the company. This was the test of fire. It
wasn’t just about carrying a file for only one month, it was six
months of direct work with the client and attending to people that
had arrived just as I had arrived a few months ago…looking for
their first job! For a Case Manager helping those who have just
arrived is a hard task but when they finish the program after six
months and you already see them working, adapted to the new life,
living independently! That is the biggest satisfaction that we have.
In October 2008 I changed positions again. Now [I am] working as
a Job Developer […] I always loved helping the clients look for a
job (Lois 2010).
As a Job Developer in the Program, Luisa is in constant contact with newly
arrived refugees. Her own refugee experience has had a profound influence on her
work.

Luisa often turns to her own experiences to guide newly arrived refugees

through the employment process. She uses her personal knowledge of life in Cuba and
in Miami to tailor standardized messages to her primarily Cuban clientele.

Luisa

understands that “the hardest thing for every immigrant is adapting to a new life and to
[a] new language [and a new] country in which they are starting from ‘zero’” (Lois
2010). Luisa, Raul and Hiram have all used their experience as refugees to ease this
period of transition and to tailor generic Federal services to the needs of their clientele.
In this section I have shown how three Cuban refugees have turned their
personal refugee experience into a career of service to new refugees. These individuals,
and many like them, use their experiences to better address the needs of Cuban
refugees in Miami. Hiram, Raul and Luisa have become part of the organization, using
their experiences to mold their respective organizations to better fit the needs of new
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refugees. The employment of past refugees by governmental and nongovernmental
organizations is the ultimate means by which refugees are involved in the shadow state.
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION

In this thesis I have argued that current understandings of the shadow state are
inadequate.

Geiger and Wolch (1986) only consider a top-down hierarchical

relationship between the government and voluntary organizations. Trudeau (2008)
correctly argues that the relationship between governmental and nongovernmental
organizations is interdependent – governments depend on voluntary organizations for
their on-the-ground expertise while voluntary organizations depend on the government
for funding. I argue that refugees play an integral part in the shadow state through
their participation in voluntary organizations.
In the previous section, I presented three ways in which refugees can participate
in voluntary organizations, and ultimately in the refugee process as a whole.

By

becoming part of their organizations, Hiram, Raul and Lucia used their personal
refugee experiences to help other refugees. Their stories are not unique. Governmental
and nongovernmental refugee resettlement organizations in Miami are staffed largely
by Cuban refugees. They each use their personal experience to improve the provision
of services for new arrivals.
The refugee experience shared by so many VOLAG employees aided greatly in
the establishment of relationships of trust. The shared refugee experience validates the
VOLAG employee’s position in the eyes of a client. Trust contributes to open channels
of communication, bringing attention to issues that individual refugees could not solve
alone. The VOLAGs used a “flexible use of scale and scope” and were able to scale-up
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issues of communal concern to state and federal governmental agencies (Kodras 1997,
p. 80).
Feedback from refugees depends on established channels of communication. Such
channels are multidirectional, as in the resettlement video that local Miami VOLAGs
created in 2008. They invited newly resettled refugees to share their experience and
advice with those preparing for departure from Cuba. The concerns and advice of the
exiles often reflected perceived shortcomings of the resettlement process, such as the
lack of reliable information about resettlement benefits.

The inclusion of these

interviews in the video show that voluntary organizations implicitly acknowledged the
shortcomings while addressing these issues through their inclusion in the video.
As revealed in the Cuban Heritage Collection documents, the government relied
greatly on on-the-ground expertise of voluntary agencies in Miami. Moreover, the
government relied on pre-established national networks of the VOLAGs to guide their
national resettlement planning, funding resettlement only in locations where
organizations had an on-the-ground presence. Conversely, some VOLAG organizations
felt that strong top-down support was necessary to further the resettlement of refugees
throughout the US. In a letter to the Director of the Cuban Refugee Program in the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, William J. vanden Heuvel, President of
the International Rescue Committee (a VOLAG), asked the President of the United
States to lend his strong support to the resettlement cause (vanden Heuvel 1963).
An examination of the current literature reveals that instances of welfare
devolution are common throughout the US and Western Europe (Cullen 2009;
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DeVerteuil et al. 2002; Ferris 1998; Geiger and Wolch 1986; Henderson 2002; Kodras
1997; Kramer 2000; Nevile 2009; Nightingale et al. 1997; Salamon 1999; Taylor and Bassi
1998; Trudeau 2008; Wolch 1990, Wolch 1999, Wolch and Rocha 1993; Wright 1981;
Young 2000). Of particular interest to this thesis is the state of affairs in the US. Budget
difficulties have contributed to a call for reduction in welfare spending and increased
privatization. Despite the immediate sense of urgency that current politicians try to
apply to each year’s budget, the reality is that such discussions are not new. Salamon
(1999) states that:
[N]onprofit organizations have had to adjust to what appears to be
a permanent situation of budgetary stringency. This stringency [has]
its origins in the conservative fiscal policies of the Reagan era of the
early 1980s (p.8, emphasis added).
Devolution of services continued beyond the Reagan administration. During the 1990s,
Republican Congressional leadership offered the US their Contract with America,
promising a new era of fiscal responsibility. Central to their plan was the bipartisan
welfare reform legislation passed under the Clinton administration in 1996.

The

Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA), as the 1996 bill was
known, emphasized employment for those who receive welfare. PRWORA shifted the
responsibility of service provision to the state and local levels “[opening] the floodgates
of devolution” (DeVerteuil et al. 2002).
“Budgetary stringency” has, as predicted by Salamon (1999), continued into the
21st century (p. 8).

Financial constraints have resulted in increased collaboration

between government and the nonprofit sector. “The numbers and variety of
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arrangements thru which government and non profits collaborate are increasing as
government seeks ways of squeezing more out of its limited resource base” (Young
2000, p. 158). In 2010, the Republican leadership, once again, reiterated its commitment
to financial responsibility in its Pledge to America. The near-shutdown of the federal
government in early 2011 was only averted by deep spending cuts. Strong bipartisan
support for the privatization of welfare services suggests that the devolution of services
will continue. Accordingly, a deeper understanding of the effects of devolution on the
provision of welfare services is necessary.
This thesis has focused specifically on refugee benefits that Cuban exiles in
Miami received. The findings suggest that local voluntary organizations provide an
opportunity for refugees to directly and indirectly influence the provision of services.
Voluntary organizations have the ability to successfully scale-up refugee concerns and
problems to state and federal governmental organizations that have the ability to
implement policy changes. I discussed the passage of the Cuban Adjustment Act of
1966 as one example how VOLAGs can scale-up the concerns of individual refugees. In
this case, VOLAGs served as a platform for refugees to address their needs, achieving
legal permanent resident status.
The findings in this thesis suggest that devolution can contribute to the
democratization of welfare services, better enabling service providers to meet the needs
of their clients. To better understand the role of devolution in the democratization of
welfare services, I recommend more case studies of geographically and culturally
diverse populations.

Also, I suggest that studies should investigate if feedback,
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experience, and becoming part of the organization exist as a means of influencing service
provision among other types of welfare service providers (i.e. housing assistance, child
care assistance, etc.).

If they do not exist, it would be beneficial to know if the

incorporation of feedback, experience, and becoming part of the organization into diverse
welfare organizations would improve the organizations’ ability to address the needs of
their clientele.

I have argued that resettlement agencies have benefited from the

employment of past-refugees. Future research should investigate if past-clientele of
other welfare organizations could similarly benefit their respective voluntary agencies.
Finally, further research on civil society could provide insight into how civil society
organizations democratize welfare services from the bottom-up.

Particularly, how

groups less politically active and unified than Cubans utilize civil society organizations.
Through the evidence provided in this thesis, it is clear that voluntary agencies
are exercising a flexible use of scale and scope to scale-up the needs and concerns of their
clientele. Refugees have become part of organizations at many levels, and have used
their own experiences to shape how resettlement organizations can better meet the
needs of refugees.

The refugee resettlement program of Catholic Charities, the

Archdiocese of Miami, has indeed led to the democratization of welfare services by
providing “a means for governments to consult migrants and thus ensure a better
match between programmes and migrants’ actual requirements” (Spencer 2005, p. 3).
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